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ABSTRACT
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) presented unique
challenges for estimating the cost of that conflict. This analysis
reviews the cost estimates and methodologies developed for that
purpose by DoD, CBO and GAO. It considers the budget climate and the
role cf foreign cash and in-kind contributions. Finally, it reviews
the budgeting innovations used to provide and monitor DS/DS defense
spending.
At the outset of the crisis, costs were estimated to determine
the defense funding requirements for DS/DS. Because of the specific
provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, these estimates
focused on the incremental impact on DoD's budget. This was
difficult because incremental costs were not defined and DoD's
accounting structure does not measure incremental costs.
As allied financial support for U.S. defense expenditures
increased, cost estimates were also used to measure the relative
contributions of donor countries. This led to debates over the
proper definition of incremental costs. Appropriate incremental
costs were collected from a budgetary viewpoint, but not from a
burden sharing perspective.
Comparing the DS/DS cost estimates and the foreign cash and in-
kind contributions, it appears that foreign contributions will cover
DoD's incremental budgetary costs, but not the total incremental
costs of the war. Acoession For
NTIS GFA&1
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The recent Persian Gulf conflict has provided numerous
lessons learned for future military operations and resulted in
new precedents for cooperation in the world. Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm also presented unique challenges for
military planners and for personnel involved in attempting to
develop cost estimates for the conflict.
With the recent dramatic changes such as Soviet political
reforms, collapse of the Warsaw pact and apparent growing
world support for the democratic process, it is possible that
future conflicts will resemble the Persian Gulf crisis. A new
American strategy emphasizing the threats of regional conflict
was officially presented by President Bush at the Aspen
Institute, on August 2, ironically on the same day Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait. While President Bush was discussing
the "new world order," peaceful coexistence, and the United
States' role in developing the strategy to support this new
concept, Saddam Hussein was in the process of providing an
early first test of this new spirit of cooperation.
The Persian Gulf conflict provided a chance to develop
procedures and explore opportunities to test world resolve and
support for just such a regional strategy. The operation
proved extremely successful and may have set many precedents
with regard to cooperation and the sharing of responsibility.
The cooperation among countries and the speed at which world
resolve was established is a tribute to the leaders involved
and has provided many interesting and complex burden sharing
questions for the future.
Equally interesting, in view of the unique budget
reduction climate in which this conflict developed, are the
issues associated with estimating the costs of the war and
deciding how it should be funded. This thesis will examine
the challenges encountered in developing cost estimates and
funding mechanisms for the Persian Gulf war and analyze the
methodologies used by various organizations to support
decisions on these issues. Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm provides an opportunity to review the process in which
decisions on funding were made and draw inferences about how
future conflicts of this nature may be accounted for and
funded.
B. OBJECTIVES
This analysis will be conducted by reviewing cost
estimates developed by the Department of Defense (DoD), the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
and discussing the methodologies supporting these estimates.
It will also examine the budgetary concerns that affected the
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specific cost estimates provided by these organizations, the
methodologies chosen, and the interrelation of these cost
estimates with economic principles.
The thesis will discuss the difficulties associated with
determining the exact incremental costs of the conflict. In
particular, it will examine how current cost estimation
procedures either supported or failed to support cost
estimation requirements.
This thesis will also review the legislative process to
analyze the impact that multi-national involvement and
financial support had upon the cost estimation process. This
aspect of the thesis is critical in view of the budget climate
at the inception of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
The primary research question addressed by this thesis
will be how did the cost estimates and underlying
methodologies used by DoD, OMB, CBO, and GAO support the
funding requirements generated from the involvement in the
war?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
The thesis also examines the following specific
underlying or subsidiary research questions:
1. Do these cost estimates reflect total or
incremental costs of the conflict? Were issues such as
3
marginal cost, opportunity cost, and sunk cost considered in
preparing the cost estimates? Which of these costs should or
should not be considered in identifying incremental costs from
a budgetary viewpoint?
2. Was there adequate guidance available to all
services in order to quickly assimilate incremental costs?
How effective was the system of reporting the costs after the
fact? Were these cost estimates compared to previous
conflicts involving U.S. Armed Forces?
3. How was budgetary incremental costing for DoD
departments affected by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of
1990? Were adequate alternative budgeting mechanisms in place
to support off budget funding for supplemental military
spending requirements (e.g., the Feed and Forage Act
procedures)? Was the current appropriation and accounting
structure sufficient to finance the war?
4. What are the future impacts of DS/DS on the U.S.
economy and budget deficit? Are there future applications for
unique funding mechanisms employed during DS/DS?
D. SCOPE, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY
1. Scope
This thesis consists primarily of a case study
comparing the methodologies used by DoD/OMB, GAO, and CBO to
estimace the incremental costs of the Persian Gulf conflict.
While there will be some discussion of DoD decisions on cost
4
estimating procedures that were independent of OMB, this
thesis will not examine in detail underlying differences in
cost estimates within DoD.
In reviewing these cost estimates, the thesis will
provide the history of decisions made concerning cost
estimates. This is critical to understanding the changes in
the budget atmosphere as world support expanded during the
conflict.
Although the thesis will compare cost estimation
methodologies to ascertain differences or similarities between
DoD/OMB, CBO, and GAO, the emphasis will be placed on
developing an understanding of methodology and not on
establishing the actual cost. However, there will be some
quantitative estimation on an aggregate level, to compare
estimates developed with different economic principles (e.g.,
if the payroll costs include only the marginal cost of
personnel employed in the conflict, would costs for personnel
affected by stop gap measures include the full pay for these
personnel or should the opportunity costs of these same
individuals be included?).
Reviewing each military department's cost estimate is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some important
generalizations concerning differences between the departments
will be discussed. Finally, the span of data and literature
review will only proceed through mid-July, when the second FY
1991 supplemental request was forwarded to Congress.
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Material associated with the legislative changes and
requirements in cost estimation are provided in Appendix A to
highlight the significant issues and decisions involved. The
reader may first want to review this appendix as it specifies
major legislation and other critical financial decisions made
during the conflict and relates these decisions to significant
events associated with the conflict itself.
2. Literature Review
In conducting the study, cost estimates will be
gleaned from government documents and other literature
available on the Persian Gulf conflict. Prior to evaluating
these documents, extensive review of articles and textbooks
presenting the mechanisms for budgeting was completed. This
background in the legislative process and economic analysis
was critical to recognizing the unique applications of
economic principles used during the Gulf war. The review of
the legislative process and understanding of it was also
necessary to discern the critical changes in the process and
their impact on budgetary concerns.
3. Methodology
There are numerous articles, congressional and
executive reports, DoD reports, and congressional testimony
addressing the actual cost estimates. However, there is
insufficient data to develop the in-depth analysis of actual
methodologies supporting these cost estimates. In order to
6
identify the actual methodologies used, a research trip to
Washington D.C., was conducted to discuss cost estimation
methodologies with key personnel in each organization. The
trip identified critical elements associated with cost
estimating methodologies which were not apparent from
reviewing the literature.
A great deal of research for this thesis, including
the research trip, was conducted in conjunction with research
efforts for a thesis on the burden sharing implications of
cost estimates for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm being
drafted by LT Brian Hinkley, also at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Although the initial base of data is similar for the
two theses, the theses take significantly divergent analytical
perspectives. This thesis will analyze cost estimate
methodologies from a budgetary viewpoint, while LT Hinkley's
thesis reviews methodologies from a burden sharing
perspective. The synergism that is created by coupling these
two theses underscores the criticality of developing different
cost estimates for different purposes.
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Specific discussions of the Persian Gulf conflict refer to
both Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and will be




This thesis would not have been possible without the
cooperation of personnel within several agencies. The efforts
of CDR Gardner, Ms. Helen Darmara, and Mr. Bob Green from
NAVCOMPT, CAPT Julihn, Mr. Dave Tarbell, Mr. Jim Townsend, Mr.
Jim Carnahan, and Mr. Robert Shue from OSD, and Mr. Don
Guessaman from OMB were instrumental in completion of this
thesis. Their suggestions, guidance, and advice in collecting
information were crucial in the formulation of the thesis.
Also instrumental in the thesis were several budget analysts
from CBO and GAO as well as several congressional staff
members from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
in both the House and the Senate. Special thanks to Ms. Linda
Schimmel from CBO for her assistance in retrieving voluminous
reports which proved to be invaluable in the development of
the thesis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I provides the background and develops the issues
addressed in this thesis.
Chapter II discusses the budget climate in place at the
inception of Desert Shield and the underlying economic
principles supporting efforts to determine the incremental
costs of the conflict.
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Chapter III discusses the individual cost estimates
developed by DoD, CBO, and GAO prior to the ground war, and
compares these estimates to costs for previous U.S. conflicts.
Chapter IV discusses the significant legislative and
financial events that occurred throughout 1990 and 1991, and
their impact on funding requirements. Additionally, this
chapter will present the innovative account structures and the
unique actions taken to finance the conflict.
Chapter V analyzes the DoD/OMB cost reports produced
following the war and identifies the implications of including
or not including certain costs. Also discussed are the types
of costs estimated and the actual cost data included within
these reports.
Chapter VI discusses the impact of DS/DS on future
budgetary requirements. Additionally, the possible future
uses of the unique funding actions taken during DS/DS are
discussed.
Chapter VII provides recommendations and conclusions.
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Ii. BUDGET CLIMATE AND UNDERLYING ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
A. GENERAL
Prior to analyzing the cost estimates developed for DS/DS,
it is prudent to review the budget climate in place at the
beginning of the Gulf crisis. Additionally, it is useful to
examine certain underlying economic principles which apply in
any discussion of issues such as incremental costs, total
costs, and sunk costs. Many assumptions developed in
preparing budgetary requirements utilize these economic
concepts as the foundation to estimate costs.
B. BUDGET CLIMATE
The incremental costs associated with the Persian Gulf
conflict have been a subject of debate since U.S. Armed Forces
were first deployed to Saudi Arabia. These debates continue
today. One obvious reason for the continuous scrutiny is the
very restrictive budget climate brought on by deficit
reduction legislation.
The restrictive climate in which defense spending operates
did not arise overnight. Consistently high deficits beginning
in the early 1980s and the dramatically changing threat to the
United States in the late 1980s dictated a reduction in
defense spending. The misconceptions or myths the American
public has about defense spending reinforced the demand for
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reduced defense spending. Some of these myths are described
in the book; "The Defense Revolution."[Ref. l:pp. 130-167]
Perceptions, prior to the crisis, of a greedy and dishonest
defense industry, incompetent military spending decisions, and
second rate military hardware purchased at exorbitantly high
prices, have placed defense spending under constant,
microscopic examination and debate. While some of these myths
concerning defense systems may have been dispelled by the
success of DS/DS, scrutiny of the defense spending has
continued.
One visible congressional concern with defense spending
was presented during testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) on the FY 1991 defense budget. Senator Nunn,
Chairman of the committee, stressed that the defense budget
for 1991 was not forward looking enough and failed to take
into account changing world conditions. One item specifically
mentioned was the increase in funding requirements for
overseas construction. It appeared that the U.S. overseas
presence would diminish yet funding levels were increasing.
In part this can be explained by the rapidly changing world
conditions and the fact that most defense budgets are
initiated one to two years in advance of the annual
congressional budget discussions. However, it was noted that
during FY 1992 budget testimony to the same committee, both
SECDEF and the CJCS were well prepared to discuss budgeting
11
and how the defense budget was modified to reflect current
U.S. strategies in view of the changing threat to the U.S.'
Considering the current budget climate and recent
initiatives to reduce overall U.S. Armed Forces and defense
spending, the American public accepted President Bush's
decision to intervene in the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis with some
hesitation. The so called "peace dividend" from defense
spending cuts was just over the horizon and was expected
shortly. Also, agreement was recently reached on defense
spending limits in the five-year budget plan. The agreement
capped the FY 1991 Defense Budget at $288.3 billion in budget
authority and $297 billion in outlays. [Ref. 2]
During debate on this budget agreement, which coincided
with the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, it was obvious
that the defense spending caps would be violated if operations
in the Middle East continued. Considering this, specific
language addressing the additional cost of the conflict was
included in Title 13 (Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990) of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990
supporting the five-year budget plan.
1 Cheney, Richard, Secretary of Defense, and Powell,
Colin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 92/93 Defense
Budget, February 21, 1991.
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C. BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1990
The language included in the BEA required that the
incremental costs of the Middle East operations be funded
through off budget emergency supplemental appropriations.
Thus, additional costs would not affect current defense
spending limits, thereby alleviating any automatic cuts in the
defense budget as a result of Desert Shield. The Act
stipulated that for any entitlement programs requiring
additional funding, there must be either compensating
reductions in current entitlement programs, or increases in
federal revenues would have to be earmarked to fund the new
program. This has been referred to as the Act's pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) provision.
There were many significant changes in the budget process,
some obvious and some not so obvious, as a result of the BEA.
Although these changes did not affect the operations in the
Middle East, they are worthy of mentioning to further define
the current budget climate. Aspects of the Act effecting
future budget decisions are summarized below: [Ref. 3:p. 25-40]
a although maximum deficit targets are still specified out
to 1995, OMB is empowered to revise them, up to three
times a year, as economic or technical considerations
warrant, thus presenting a moving deficit target.
^ the Act changed the emphasis in the congressional budget
process from controlling the growth of the deficit to
limiting spending
- the Act lessened the possibility of a general
sequestration for at least the next two fiscal years.
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" the Act allowed some expenditures to be exempt from
spending caps, once designated as emergent in nature by
Congress and the Administration.
Since its passage, there has been considerable discussion
whether BEA has controlled spending. While 1991 deficits
will exceed the all-time record of $221 billion in FY 1986,
the deficit will be lower than expected. In February, 1991,
the FY 1991 budget deficit was projected to reach $318
billion. However, the deficit for FY 1991 is now expected to
reach only $280 billion. [Ref. 4:p. 2] The decrease is due
the interest that has been generated from the foreign
contributions for DS/DS and delays in the Savings and Loan
bailout. Considering the comparative ease and little public
scrutiny with which the FY 1992 congressional budget
resolution was passed, with record deficits projected for
1992, it is clear the BEA has influenced the budget process
but only in shifting focus off the deficit, not in reducing
it. No longer are there cries for deficit reduction and
drastic cuts. There are, however, spending caps in place and
if these caps are surpassed by anything other than "emergent
expenses," automatic cuts in budgets will occur.
The primary difficulty with the Act, from a budgetary
viewpoint, concerns emergency expenses. They are exempt from
triggering automatic cuts and allow increased spending, but
they are not well defined. For example, in past budgets
Congress appropriated funds to fight forest fires in national
parks. [Ref. 4:p. 3] This year funds may only be appropriated
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to cover half of the average number of fires expected. If the
funding levels were based on true estimation of expected
fires, this would be acceptable. However, it appears that the
budget has been cut to shift part of the expenses to
subsequent emergent funding. If the number of fires is
greater than half the average, then additional funding can be
requested to fight these "unforseen" emergency fires. By
claiming the higher incidence of fires was unexpected, these
requests would satisfy the requirement of emergency
supplemental appropriation. Who will argue that the
additional fires are not emergency requirements and avoid any
automatic cuts in current spending to finance these additional
operations?
There obviously have been some significant changes to the
budgeting process as a result of the Act. However, there are
numerous questions with regard to its effectiveness and many
speculate that it will neither limit spending nor reduce
deficits. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate
the BEA itself. The review here is limited to those areas
impacting estimates of the incremental costs of DS/DS.
Several parts of the BEA affect cost estimation for the
Persian Gulf conflict. As mentioned above, the Act did exempt
the costs of DS/DS from the spending limits, but the language
in the Act stipulated that only incremental costs would be
captured:
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Desert Shield costs mean those incremental costs directly
associated with the increase in operations in the Middle
East and do not include costs that would be experienced by
the Department of Defense as part of its normal operations
absent Operation Desert Shield. [Ref. 5:p. H12591]
This language was intended to ensure a clear understanding
of costs to be captured while not triggering automatic cuts in
defense spending. Although not stated in the Act, it was
apparent that the language was designed to ensure that DoD did
not use the operation to increase annual defense spending and
regain funds cut in the five-year budget agreement. However,
the use of incremental costs in the language did not alleviate
all confusion in determining which costs met the definition of
incremental costs of the war.
The legislative requirement allowing only the incremental
costs of the conflict to remain exempt from the spending caps
motivated discussions on which costs met this requirement.
Associated with this discussion came the review of what were
the incremental or marginal costs.
D. OPPORTUNITY COST AND MARGINALISH2
The opportunity cost concept recognizes that the federal
budget is limited. Therefore, spending and regulatory
decisions that use scarce resources incur costs in terms of
This discussion is based on a paper written at the
Naval Postgraduate School titled "Cost Estimates for Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm," jointly developed by LCDR John
Espie, LT Brian Hinkley, and LCDR Andy Johnson in the Spring
of 1991.
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foregone alternatives. If funds are used for one particular
purpose, competing uses may go unfunded. Opportunity cost
measures the cost of a decision in terms of the value of the
forgone alternative. This is the appropriate definition of
cost when resources are limited.
A strict definition of economic marginalism is the cost or
benefit associated with the production or consumption of one
additional unit. In relation to defense, where one additional
unit is not well defined and difficult to measure, marginalism
becomes equated with incremental cost. Therefore, marginalism
entails looking strictly at the additional costs and benefits
associated with a particular contingency.
Equity, the primary concern of every burden sharing
debate, requires that the marginal costs and the marginal
benefits of each burden sharing member be balanced in relation
to every other member. Therefore, for burden sharing purposes
in defense alliances, the total marginal (incremental) costs
are the appropriate cost measure for determining equity, and
the costs (current and future) should be valued in terms of
opportunity costs because of the scarcity of defense
resources.
For defense budgetary concerns, the only costs that are
appropriately included are those costs which are the marginal
costs of defense. That is, the costs of the contingency
operation that otherwise would not have been incurred. These
marginal costs should also be valued in terms of opportunity
17
costs. The emphasis of the thesis is to address costs that
should be considered from a budgetary viewpoint. This thesis
will examine whether the cost estimates provided for DS/DS
satisfy these requirements.
18
III. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF COST ESTIMATES
A. DoD, CBO, AND GAO INCREMENTAL COST ESTIMATES
Starting in mid-August, there were efforts to gather the
projected costs of the operation and ensure ample time to
generate the funding required. In September 1990, DoD
provided the first estimates for the operation, which were
presented prior to the signing of the BEA. The cost estimates
were $2.7 billion in budget authority and $1.9 in outlays,
covering the period from August 2, 1990 through September 31,
1990.[Ref. 6] Later that month, DoD revised these estimates
to $2.9 billion in budget authority and $2.1 in outlays and
estimated that the incremental costs for FY 1991 would be $15
billion. [Ref. 7] These estimates were based on an expected
deployment of 210,000 personnel in the region throughout FY
1991. Critically, the estimate for FY 1991 also assumed there
would be no armed conflict.
In September, CBO provided its estimates for the costs of
the operations in the Middle East, based on DoD
information.[Ret. 8] Table I provides the FY 1990 cost
estimates as developed by DoD and CBO while Figure 1
highlights the categories with the largest difference in
estimates.
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TABLE I. FY 1990 COST ESTIMATES FOR DESERT SHIELD
(IN MILLIONS)
CATEGORY DoD CBO DIFFERENCE
LESS THAN
DoD IN ()
AIRLIFT 472 484 12
SEALIFT 275 336 61
OTHER DEPLOYMENT 271 250 (21)
MEDICAL 42 30 (12)
OPERATING COSTS 873 418 (455)
RESERVE CALL-UP 178 168 (10)
IN-THEATRE SUPPORT 250 250 0
OTHER 20 7 (13)
DESERT SHIELD SUBTOTAL 2381 1943 (438)
FUEL PRICE INCREASE 300 300 0
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 35 0 (35)
TOTAL 2716 2243 (473)
Source: DoD, "Preliminary Desert Shield Costs"
(September 25, 1990), and CBO, "Estimated Costs of
Operation Desert Shield" (September 7, 1990).
20
















Figure 1 - Major Differences in FY 1990 Cost Estimates
CBO estimated $2.2 billion in budget authority and $1.7
billion in outlays would be required for FY 1990, about a $500
million difference from DoD's FY 1990 estimates for
outlays.
Estimates were also provided by CBO for expected FY 1991
costs and are provided in Table II. The major differences in
the cost estimates between DoD and CBO are highlighted in
Figure 2.
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TABLE II. FY 1991 COST ESTIMATES FOR DESERT SHIELD
(IN MILLIONS)
CATEGORY DoD CBO DIFFERENCE
LESS THAN
DoD IN ()
AIRLIFT 2240 148 (2092)
SEALIFT 1560 34 (1526)
OTHER DEPLOYMENT 430 0 (430)
MEDICAL 50 8 (42)
OPERATING COSTS 2520 2664 144
RESERVE CALL-UP 2800 2365 (435)
IN-THEATRE SUPPORT 1800 1360 (440)
OTHER 60 85 25
DESERT SHIELD SUBTOTAL 11460 6664 (4796)
FUEL PRICE INCREASE 1740 900 (840)
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 1800 0 (1800)
TOTAL 15000 7564 (7436)
Source: DoD, "Preliminary Desert Shield Costs"
(September 25, 1990), and CBO, "Estimated Costs of
Operation Desert Shield" (September 7, 1990).
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Figure 2 - Major Differences in FY 1991 Cost Estimates
CBO projected $7.6 in budget authority and $6.3 billion in
outlays would be required, a difference of $7 billion. CBO's
assumptions on the FY 1991 estimates were somewhat different
than DoD' s. Although they estimated 210,000 military personnel
would be deployed to the area, CBO assumed that transportation
of personnel destined for the Middle East would decline in FY
1991 and projected higher efficiency in transportation of
rotating personnel in FY 1991 than DoD. Specifically, DoD
budgeted $3.6 billion for transportation in FY 1991 while CBO
only estimated $200 million.
23
The other primary discrepancy between estimates was
military construction. CBO did not estimate any cost for
military construction while DoD estimated $1.8 billion. The
CBO memorandum stated that it was unable to provide an
estimate on military construction because CBO had no basis on
which to estimate these costs. It was unclear from DoD data
exactly what type of facilities were desired, the expected
length of usage, or what would be the cost of construction.
Another discrepancy, although not as critical as military
construction or personnel transportation, was the difference
in the fuel price estimates. While DoD had estimated a price
increase of $10 per barrel for 1991, CBO only used a $5
increase. For each dollar difference in fuel costs, DoD
estimated an annualized cost to DoD of $200 million.'
Other assumptions used by both DoD and CBO included
allotting for rotation of personnel every six months,
increased operations tempo for the services with the exception
of the Navy 4, and no reimbursement from allies. Because both
agencies made similar assumptions in developing their
3 This information was included in a fact sheet prepared
by Mr Robert Shue, Office of the DoD Comptroller, on August
15, 1990 to provide initial cost estimates for Desert Shield.
4 Although there was recognition of increased costs due
to increased operating tempo, it was argued that the Navy is
more frequently involved in forward deployed status and did
not have the initial costs of unexpected forward deployment
that the other services experienced.
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estimates, these assumptions did not create differences in the
cost estimates.
As a result of President Bush's November 8, 1990 decision
to increase troop strength in the Middle East, CBO revised its
incremental cost estimates for the operations.[Ref. 9] They
estimated the total incremental costs of the operation for FY
1991 to be $12.1 billion, adding $1.3 billion for the costs of
moving an additional 200,000 troops and $3.2 billion for
recurring costs of these additional troops for the remaining
nine months of FY 1991.
Although no formal estimates were provided by DoD during
this time, some published reports indicated that DoD's new
estimate for FY 1991 was expected to be roughly $31
billion. [Ref. 10:p. Al] These estimates for FY 1991 costs and
underlying assumptions are provided in Table III. Cost
estimates are presented in chronological order for the entire
period between September 6, 1990 and February 27, 1991. Each
new cost estimate is underlined as it was presented.
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TABLE III. FY 1991 DS/DS COST ESTIMATE HISTORY
ESTIMATES OF PERSIAN GULF COSTS FOR FY 1991
(IN BILLIONS)
D AT E JDD CBO0 GAO A SS UMP T ION
SEP 6, 90 15 - - DoD-210,000 PERSONNEL
WITH NO HOSTILITIES
SEP 7, 90 15 7.6 CBO-210,000 PERSONNEL
WITH MAJORITY OF LIFT
COMPLETE BY END OF FY
90 AND NO HOSTILITIES




DEC 10, 90 31 12.1 DoD-ADDITIONAL USE OF
200,000 RESERVES WITH
NO HOSTILITIES5
JAN 4, 91 31 12.1 34 GAO-TOTAL OF 450,000
PERSONNEL WITH NO
HOSTILITIES
JAN 15, 91 31 15-25 34 CBO-UPDATED ESTIMATE
FOR DEPLOYMENT OF
400,000 PERSONNEL
THROUGH FY 1991 WITH NO
HOSTILITIES
14-18 CBO-NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT BY MARCH 1,
1991, WITH DEPLOYED
PERSONNEL LEVELS
DROPPING TO 100,000 BY
END OF FY 1991
17-35 CBO-HOSTILITIES BEGIN
IN FIRST FEW MONTHS OF
1991, WITH RANGE OF
COSTS BASED ON DURATION
OF WAR, AND NOT ALL
EQUIPMENT OR MUNITIONS
WILL BE REPLACED
5 This figure reported by the New York Times, there was
no official estimate provided by DoD at this time. [Ref. 10]
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(TABLE III continued)
FEB 22, 91 45-60 17-35 - DoD-BASED ON CURRENT
DAILY COSTS OF COMBAT,





FEB 27, 91 45-60 44-54 CBO-BASED ON DURATION
OF WAR, USING DoD DATA,
BUT NOT REPLACING ALL
EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS
_EXPENDED
SOURCE: 1) Various DoD, CBO, and GAO reports on costs of the
operation.
In January, in anticipation of a supplemental Desert
Shield appropriation request from DoD for FY 1991, testimony
was requested by Congress to define what the incremental costs
of the war would be for FY 1991.6 The testimony occurred
before the House Budget Committee, chaired by Representative
Panetta, meeting on the costs and financing of operation
Desert Shield.
During this January 4, 1991 meeting, GAO presented
testimony on the incremental costs of Desert Shield. In this
testimony, GAO estimated that the incremental costs of Desert
Shield would be about $34 billion. [Ref ll:p. 4] One primary
assumption supporting its estimate was that troop levels would
6 Presenting testimony to the House Budget Committee were
the GAO Comptroller General, Charles A. Bowsher, the Director
of the Defense Budget Project, Dr Gordon Adams, and Mr.
Lawrence J. Korb of The Brookings Institution.
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remain at about 450,000 through FY 1991. This estimate
appeared to be more in line with DoD's unconfirmed cost
estimates.
Also in January, 1991, CBO provided a memorandum for the
House Budget Committee updating cost estimates for the
conflict. In this memorandum, CBO analyzed in detail
projected costs of the war under different scenarios. These
scenarios ranged from a negotiated settlement with Iraq by
March 31, 1991 (as specifically requested by the Chairman of
the House Budget Committee) to a war continuing through FY
1991. [Ref. 12:p. 5] The first cost estimate revised was the
November 13, 1990, estimate. CBO had initially assumed 60,000
reservists would be called to active duty. It now appeared
that 150,000 was a better number. In view of this, CBO raised
its earlier estimate by $3 billion to a total of $15.1
billion.
While the January report updated the initial cost
estimate, it also stipulated that CBO's estimate might still
be lower than DoD's estimate due to differences in the costs
of deploying troops and the costs of military construction.
Specifically, DoD had anticipated a fourfold increase in
transportation costs between FY 1990 and FY 1991, which
reflected uncertainty concerning troop and equipment
28
rotation.7 In addition, CBO still had the same concerns over
type, duration, and construction cost of facilities. They
stated they could not provide an accurate estimate in this
area.
Although all estimates presented stated certain
assumptions and qualified certain figures, CBO's analysis
provided the first public in-depth analysis of the
methodologies used to develop early estimates.8  In their
January memorandum, CBO attempted to develop possible cost
estimates for various situations and provided several cost
estimate ranges based on the following different
assumptions: [Ref. 12:p. 5]
1) continue as is = $15-25 billion (assuming current levels of
troops remain in area through FY 1991)
2) negotiated settlement by March 1 = $14-18 billion (assuming
troop levels will fall from 400,000 to 100,000 by end of FY
1991)
3) event of war = $17-35 billion (depending on duration and
type war, and how much of the equipment lost in the conflict
was to be replaced)
There was some discussion as to how personnel would be
rotated out of the area. Would they be rotated with their own
equipment or could the equipment be left behind for the
relieving unit? The option of leaving the equipment behind
seemed to make sense economically; however, the inefficiency
in not having the troops continue to use the equipment with
which they were familiar and had trained was the counter to
this argument.
a The methodology used by CBO for its January estimates
is included in Appendix B.
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While these estimates and testimony presented Congress
with rough cost estimates in different situations, most
reports pointed out the difficulty of determining these costs.
For example, the January CBO report stated:
No one can estimate the cost of war with confidence
because costs would depend critically on how such a war
was fought. [Ref. ll:p. 7]
The CBO report concluded with a statement addressing
current overriding concerns with costs of the war in general:
These costs are important and must be considered in
debates over U.S. spending choices and fiscal policies.
Nevertheless, considerations other than costs-including
threats to U.S. and world security and the potential loss
of human life-must figure most prominently in decisions
about war and peace in the Persian Gulf. (Ref. ll:p. 13)
In February, as part of the background material for the FY
1991 DS/DS Supplemental Appropriation Request, DoD provided
updated FY 1991 cost estimates for DS/DS. The revised DoD
estimates for FY 1991 were $39.2 billion in incremental
baseline costs with an estimated daily operating cost of $150-
$1,650 million for the costs of combat which commenced on
January 16, 1991.[Ref. 13:pp. 5-9] Coupling the baseline
costs with the daily operating costs brought the total
estimate for DoD to between $45-60 billion dependent on the
duration of the war and the amount of munitions and equipment
to be replaced.
Later in February, based on DoD data, CBO testified before
Congress and estimated the costs for the war would run between
$44-54 billion based on the duration of war and amount of
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equipment and munitions required to be replaced. While the
outcome of the war was unclear at the time of this testimony,
it was projected the war would soon come to a successful
conclusion. The main difference in the ranges of costs for
the war between CBO and DoD at this time was the levels of
munitions and equipment which would be replaced after the war.
CBO estimated lower levels than DoD and did not project the
requirement to return to prewar munitions levels.
As highlighted in Tables II and III, CBO cost estimates
remained lower than estimates from most of the other
organizations for similar scenarios. There is a subtle reason
why. CBO is tasked with determining the supplemental costs
Congress should appropriate to DoD to cover the incremental
costs of the operation and does not necessarily report total
incremental costs. DoD and GAO, while also attempting to
provide these marginal costs, reported total incremental costs
of the war and then determined the offsetting reductions
available. Compounding the complex measurement problems, the
incremental costs were being estimated to serve different
objectives - each estimate valid for their particular purpose.
CBO was strictly looking at the usage of resources above the
amount DoD has currently been allocated in its annual budget.
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B. DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING INCREMENTAL COSTS
This question of what costs constitute the true
incremental costs of the war is a primary area of interest.
The understanding and applicability of incremental cost and
the controversy over what constituted the true incremental
cost of the war fueled the majority of cost estimation debates
early in the conflict.
As indicated in this chapter, many factors played in
accurately estimating the costs for the conflict. Not only
were there conceptual problems but there were definitional
problems as well. These issues are addressed here.
At the inception of the conflict, DoD and CBO attempted to
estimate how much the war would cost. It was apparent that
although the incremental costs of the war were the only ones
to be financed in the near term, the concepts associated with
incremental cost estimates could be quite encompassing. For
example, the estimates couild include future increases in
foreign aid, military support to allies, increased future
deployments to the region to ensure stability after U.S.
withdrawal, and the impact of higher fuel prices on the U.S.
economy. The elements of these indirect and direct costs were
unlimited and difficult to capture.
Considering the difficult concept of incremental costs,
the congressional leadership focused only on the direct
incremental costs or near term costs of the conflict. This
would at least allow a thorough review of additional funding
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requirements necessary for the conflict. But total
expenditures remained critical to the burden sharing issue.
Within the legislation passed earlier, the difficulty in
conceptually understanding incremental costs was apparent.
The language addressing incremental costs seemed very
specific, but in reality presented difficulty in application.
Early in the operation, DoD was asked to provide cost
estimates for those expenses that were above and beyond what
costs were expected if the Persian Gulf Conflict had not
occurred. In response to congressional inquiry, and in order
to assist in the strategy of developing coalition funding
assistance, DoD had to develop these estimates, even if very
rough. This created difficulties with the mechanics of
estimating costs, using current accounting systems, as will be
discussed later. It was difficult to define the exact costs
that were incremental in nature and solely incurred due to the
conflict.
One of the first areas where this confusion became obvious
was in the discussions associated with the additional fuel
costs for the conflict. While no one argued the fact that
these operations would require a higher operating tempo than
normal, end therefore additional fuel costs, there were
discussions on whether these additional incremental fuel costs
should include the price increases due to the Persian Gulf
crisis. More importantly, should DoD units not involved in
the crisis be compensated for the increased fuel cost? The
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increase in price was a fallout of the Middle East crisis and
not planned for in the defense budget. Thus, DoD assumed that
forces not involved in Middle East operations were suffering
the fuel price increases due to the conflict. With this
supporting analysis in hand, DoD included the fuel price
increase for all DoD forces in its supplemental request.
While this inclusion was opposed by both GAO and CBO,
eventual congressional action authorized this cost as
incremental, although later stipulations were made limiting
what funds could be used to finance these non-DS/DS DoD fuel
costs. Authorizing these costs was unusual in that previous
fuel price increases were required to be absorbed in current
appropriated budgets. There was no allowance for other
federal agencies, such as the Department of Transportation
(DOT) or Department of Energy (DOE), to capture this fuel
price increase.
Another area of difficulty was determining the
incremental costs of supplies purchased during the conflict.
While increased supply stockpiles were required to support the
war effort, it was difficult to determine which purchases
merely accelerated replacements that would have been required
at some point in the future, and which were solely due to
DS/DS. The stockpile replacement dilemma is illustrated in
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the case of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)9. While all
three MPS squadrons were utilized to support the conflict, how
much should be charged to the cost of the war?[Ref. 14:p. 63]
Specifically, each year one squadron is downloaded and
equipment and supplies are replaced, repaired and updated as
required. The squadron is then returned to prepositioning
status. Considering this, should all three MPS squadron's
replenishment be charged to the war? Alternatively, should
this year's scheduled replenishment of one squadron be
excluded from the incremental cost of the war because it would
have been replaced anyway? Should the other two squadrons
also be omitted because they too would have been replaced at
a later date?
Other areas of defense spending were equally difficult to
measure. For example, there were interesting discussions
concerning the estimates for airlift. DoD had to establish
the rate at which to estimate the cost of airlift and charge
the using services accordingly. However, the increased
operating tempo created some anomalies in the system resulting
in costs being overestimated for airlift. GAO described this
9 MPS are squadrons of ships (thirteen total) in which
military equipment and thirty days of supplies for three
Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) are stored as part of the
mobility enhancement program. These ships are organized as
squadrons and are normally based in Diego Garcia, Guam and the
Atlantic. The purpose of such prepositioning is to quickly
support deployed operations and to alleviate some of the
requirement for forces to deploy with all their equipment,
reducing lift requirement.
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effect in a discussion of Military Airlift Command (MAC)
charges:
MAC develops its tariffs based on its estimates of costs
it will incur, including an amount to recapture fixed
costs. The fixed costs are spread over its approved
flying hours, 450,000 in the 1991 budget. To the extent
MAC bills more that its approved flying hours, it will be
recovering an amount in excess of its fixed costs. MAC
indicated to the GAO that they may end the year having
flown twice their approved flying hours. Actual billed
hours will of course not be known until the end of the
fiscal year.[Ref. 12:p. 13]
Another area included in discussions of incremental costs
is munitions and equipment replacement. While DoD was
estimating the cost of using and replacing such equipment
early in the conflict, CBO, GAO, and other organizations were
quick to point out the difficulty with these estimates. The
real issue was whether to reimburse the cost of expended
equipment if future plans were to eliminate this equipment.
Specifically, do you replace munitions expended that were
drawn from stockpiles scheduled for down sizing due to force
reductions? How were you to capture the costs of equipment
replacement if the production line was closed for that
particular piece, or if the hardware was obsolete? Do you
charge the replacement cost of a new updated version? Are
different measures for these costs appropriate depending on
whether you are trying to provide the total incremental cost
of the war or the additional budgeting requirements?
These are difficult questions to answer. Testimony by GAO
identified three costs of the conflict to be considered. The
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first was the baseline cost of the war. This cost consisted of
the amount of money required to train, equip, and maintain the
armed forces at 500,000 personnel. These costs are considered
sunk costs and should not be captured in additional funding
requirements or recouped from allied contributions. These
forces would be on active duty regardless of Desert Shield or
any other operation. Although, in view of the cutbacks
envisioned prior to the war, there could be some impact of the
war on retaining a higher level of personnel than originally
predicted.
The second cost is the true incremental DoD costs as a
direct result of DS/DS. These are the costs that the Defense
Department would not have incurred if the conflict had not
occurred.
The last category of cost discussed in the GAO testimony
is the direct non-defense related expenses, such as foreign
aid and debt relief of certain frontline countries for their
support of the coalition forces during the conflict.10 While
these non-defense related costs do reflect incremental costs
of the war and should be considered from an overall budgetary
viewpoint, they were not included in DoD cost estimates.
The report also notes that incremental costs of the war
must take into consideration the offsets the war provided. For
10 Frontline countries are those countries impacted by
economic sanctions against Iraq and countries which incurred
significant costs in refugee relief (e.g., Turkey, Egypt,
Israel, Syria).
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example, several training exercises were canceled due to the
deployment of forces to the Middle East. The budgeted amounts
required for these exercises should be deducted from the costs
of the war as incremental cost savings. Another offset,
alluded to previously, is the treatment of supplies. If the
supplies were eventually to be purchased anyway, then those
supplies not used and available after the conflict should not
be added to the costs of the conflict. The last offset would
be to ensure that in-kind assistance such as fuel, water,
food, medical supplies, and transportation not be included in
funding requirements as the value of this assistance should be
backed out of the incremental costs presented by DoD.
C. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS CONFLICTS
These were very difficult issues and opinions differed on
how these costs should be determined. When situations like
these arise in the budget process, there is a tendency to
compare the new situation to previous events. The Persian
Gulf conflict was no exception.
As cost estimates were developed during the conflict,
comparisons were drawn to costs experienced in previous
conflicts such as the Vietnam War, Korean War, and others.
1. Cost Comparison
In testimony before the House Budget Committee in
January, prior to the beginning of hostilities, the cost of
the Vietnam War, in 1990 dollars, was estimated to be $427
38
billion. At the peak of fighting, in 1969, 538,700 personnel
were deployed in Vietnam. The annual cost of the war was
placed at $85.6 b.llion (once again in 1990 dollars). This
equates to an average of $7 billion per month. [Ref. 15:p. 6]
In contrast, DoD's rough cost estimate of DS/DS prior
to hostilities was about $2 billion per month."1  This
comparison indicated that if hostilities broke out, these cost
estimates could easily triple, assuming Vietnam is an
indication of the possible costs of war in DS/DS. This
position was further supported given the advanced weapons
being used in the Gulf and the increased operating and
maintenance costs for these systems. Also, the Gulf war was
expected to use more tanks than Vietnam and costs could
increase with the loss of these systems.
Testimony from the Comptroller General of GAO, was
also provided to the same committee in February. In GAO's
report, the costs of the Gulf conflict were compared to the
Vietnam costs. Specifically, the costs associated with
monthly operations and maintenance accounts were already equal
to the costs of the peak months of combat during the Vietnam
war. [Ref. 16:p. 5] These costs reflected operations prior to
the beginning of the ground war. While both of these reports
compared the costs of DS/DS and Vietnam, the differences in
" This figure was estimated from the unconfirmed reports
that new DoD estimates at this time were estimating the cost
of the war for FY 1991 at about $30 billion.
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force structure, type of warfare, and intensity of operations
were recognized. Even with uncertainty concerning the
validity of this comparison, the bottom line that the costs of
DS/DS may be underestimated drew congressional attention.
Another interesting comparison of costs of conflict,
referred to in testimony before the House Budget Committee,
was the costs for the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. (Ref. 15:p. 6]
This estimate was presented to reflect a more similar conflict
and the possible costs. During this war, the estimated
Israeli daily expenses were $250 million. This represented
roughly $750 million per day in 1991 dollars. [Ref. 17:pp. 235-
236] This was equal to about the median of DoD estimates for
projected daily operations ($150 million to $1,650 million).
2. Financing Comparisons
As the enormity of the costs increased, further
concern was created with regard to the mechanisms available to
pay for the war, particularly before allied contributions
increased in January 1991. Some of the first thoughts on
funding the war centered on the option of a surtax, similar to
Vietnam. During congressional testimony, a surtax was
considered inappropriate under the current economic
conditions. Specifically, the economic conditions prevalent
in the Vietnam War era, nearly full employment, little excess
capacity and high inflation, encouraged the use of the tax to
cool off the economy. With the recession during DS/DS and the
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limited investment required to replace military inventories,
a surtax was not considered appropriate, as observed by the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board during testimony before
Congress. [Ref. 18:p. Al]
While concerns over spending remained, borrowing
against the deficit to fund the war appeared a more likely
option. However, as foreign contributions increased and the
war was successfully completed in a short time period, it
appeared the contributions would at least cover the majority
of defense costs, if not all. As this transition occurred,
-oncerns over costs turned to the collection of actual
contributions.
In Chapter V, the actual cost reports provided by OMB
to Congress will be analyzed and additional discussion will be
presented on the incremental cost issues that continue to be
debated following the conclusion of the war. Prior to
discussing these reports, it is informative to examine the
legislative budget process which supported the war as it
progressed. The Persian Gulf Conflict presented unique
circumstances for the budget process and provided unusual
vehicles for funding decisions.
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IV. FUNDING PROCESS/SUPPORTING ACTIONS DURING DS/DS
A. CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONS ON FUNDING ISSUES
In the earliest stages of the conflict, the executive and
legislative branch sought methods by which to support the
costs of the operations. Beginning in early August, DoD
initiated efforts to estimate the costs and determine the
required funding to maintain operations and not detrimentally
impact worldwide military operations.
On August 15, 1990, SECDEF briefed the President on the
expected costs of Operation Desert Shield and the potential
impact on other current military operations. On August 24,
SECDEF invoked Revised Statues 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11), the Feed
and Forage Act. [Ref. 19] The Act authorized DoD to obligate
funds beyond those currently appropriated by Congress to
continue operations through the remainder of FY 1990. As the
operation progressed, SECDEF collected initial cost estimates
from the services.
On September 6, 1990, SECDEF forwarded a request to OMB
for an FY 1990 Supplemental Defense Appropriation. This
appropriation request covered both the obligations incurred as
a result of invoking the Feed and Forage Act and other
expenses associated with Desert Shield. Although DoD
estimated the incremental costs for Desert Shield of $2.7
42
billion, some of these costs had been covered by transferring
funds or by deferring and canceling lower priority
requirements. The actual incremental cost for DoD that
required additional funding was $1.885 billion. [Ref. 6]
On September 14, 1990, President Bush forwarded this DoD
supplemental request to Congress; included within the request
was a proposal to cancel Egypt's military debt of about $7
billion. This action was to express gratitude for the support
Egypt demonstrated during the initial phases of the
conflict. [Ref. 20]
The administration was equally busy during this time
looking for ways to develop coalition forces in the Middle
East and contacting allies to assist in funding the coalition
efforts. During the month of September, the first of these
"tin cup" trips was conducted in an effort to raise
contributions to offset the costs of the operation for the
U.S. There were two separate groups conducting the "tin cup"
trips, one by Secretary of State Baker and the other by the
Secretary of the Treasury Brady. [Ref. 21:p. 10] These trips
were supported by the State Department, DoD, and the Treasury
Department and involved personnel from each on the actual
trips. [Ref. 22]
Later in September, DoD revised the estimates for costs in
August and September to $2.7 billion in total incremental
costs and $2.1 billion in incremental costs requiring
additional funding. [Ref. 7]
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On October 1, the first continuing resolution was signed
into law, appropriating $2,013,664,000 for Desert Shield
expenses. The resolution also granted DoD the authority to
transfer $75,037,000 from DoD accounts to accounts depleted as
a result of Desert Shield. Additionally, the Defense
Cooperation Account (DCA) was established to allow foreign
nations and individuals to contribute funds to support defense
spending for Desert Shield. However, these funds were only to
be utilized by DoD after they were authorized and appropriated
by Congress. Also included in the resolution was authority to
delay the impending default deadline on Egypt's military sales
debt until December 31, 1990.[Ref. 23]
On October 26, 1990, the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act
was enacted authorizing the funds that had been appropriated
($2.1 billion) in the continuing resolution. [Ref. 24] An
additional $1 billion was authorized for Desert Shield-related
expenses for FY 1991 to be placed into the DCA. This
additional authorization was an attempt by the chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) to provide funding for
areas revealed to require "fixing" by Desert Shield. [Ref. 25]
The additional $1 billion funding was primarily divided
between the authorization of imminent danger pay ($110 per
month) for personnel in Saudi Arabia and for certain defense
programs (chemical and biological equipment, sealift, airlift,
and minehunters). The Act showed the allies contributing to
Desert Shield that the U.S. was willing to provide funds as
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well and that there was a concerted effort to ensure that the
funds placed into the DCA were only used for incremental costs
of the conflict.
On November 5, 1990, the FY 1991 Defense Appropriation Act
was signed, appropriating the $1 billion authorized in
October. [Ref. 26) The Act also included an amendment to Title
10, U.S.C., adjusting the initial active duty period and
additional active duty period for Selected Reserves from 90 to
180 days. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act was
signed into law on the same day. (Ref. 27] It required the
President to conduct a conference on the Egypt debt. If it
was deemed in the best interest of national security, the
President was authorized to cancel the debt.
Many people have commented that during January of 1991,
we saw the finest display of the democratic process in quite
some time. These thoughts were a result of the congressional
discussions on determining if the President had the authority
to use offensive action against Iraq without congressional
approval. In November 1990, the U.N. had approved Resolution
678 giving the Member-states authority to use whatever means
necessary to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait after January 15,
1991. [Ref. 28:p. 7] The ultimate result of these debates, and
various resolutions passed in Congress and the Senate, was to
allow the use of military force if the President certified
that diplomatic means and economic sanctions failed to resolve
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the crisis. The Act mandating these actions was signed into
law on January 14, 1991.[Ref. 29]
With the air campaign in January and the return of
Congress following the winter recess, concern increased over
the additiontl costs the conflict might create. On February
12, 1991, SECDEF once again invoked the Feed and Forage Act to
obligate funds beyond those appropriated and authorized at the
time. [Ref. 21:p. 6] On February 22, 1991, the first FY 1991
Defense Supplemental Appropriation request was transmitted to
Congress by the President. [Ref. 22:p. 7] The request was for
$42.6 billion in supplemental emergency appropriations to
cover financial requirements for FY 1991 DS/DS incremental
costs.
Included within the request was a unique procedure for
handling these funds. The President requested that SECDEF
have authority to transfer funds from DCA to DoD accounts,
with the approval of OMB, but without the usual congressional
authorization and appropriation. The President also requested
t.-t the Working Capital Account be established. The Working
Capital Account would be funded by the U.S. with $15 billion.
In the event that the DCA account balance was unable to meet
DoD needs, SECDEF would be authorized to transfer funds from
this account to DoD accounts as deemed necessary to meet
defense needs for the conflict. Transfers could be made with
OMB approval, but would not require congressional action.
This account would provide a "bridge loan" until sufficient
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funds were placed into the DCA by foreign contributions.
Lastly, the request included a proposal that Congress formally
appropriate DoD the money contributed to the DCA without any
specific amount indicated - a blank check request.
In February, the ground war commenced and was successfully
concluded within four days. Iraq surrendered unconditionally
and agreed to all U.N. Resolutions.. The following month
Congress debated the FY 1991 DoD supplemental request. On
April 6, 1991, the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 was signed
into law. [Ref. 30] The Act authorized $42.6 billion to cover
the incremental costs of the war, bringing the total
authorization for DS/DS to $45.7 billion to date. 2
This Act required DoD to submit detailed monthly reports
on the actual incremental costs incurred for the war. These
reports were to include an estimate of the value of the in-
kind assistance provided to DoD forces by coalition members
(e.g., food, water, fuel, etc). This Act also required that
DoD withhold payments to non-paying pledging nations for
reimbursement of indirect-hire foreign nationals working at
12 The total of $45.6 billion equals the $2.1 billion
appropriated for the FY 1990 costs of Desert Shield plus the
$1 billion appropriated in the FY 1991 Defense Appropriation
Act plus the $42.6 appropriated in the FY 1991 Supplemental
Act for DS/DS.
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U.S. installations abroad, though SECDEF could waive this
provision.13
Following this Act, the Operation DS/DS Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1991 was signed into law and
appropriated $42,625,822,000 to DoD.[Ref. 31] The Act
established an account called the Persian Gulf Regional
Defense Fund, and $15 billion was placed in the account.
However, the Act did not allow SECDEF to have authority over
the account for any amount required - denying the request for
"blank check avthority".
Instead, SECDEF could only transfer funds from this
account when the balance in the DCA was insufficient to meet
amounts authorized and appropriated by Congress. Also, SECDEF
was required to notify Congress seven days prior to executing
any transfer from the Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund. If
any funds were used from the account, they would be replaced
as soon as funds in the DCA were available. Finally, the Act
prohibited arms sales to nations not fulfilling the
commitments made to the U.S. during the crisis. This action
typified Congress's concern that countries would not follow
through on their pledges after the war was over.
These were not the only decisions and discussions that
occurred in the months immediately after the war. There were
13 It was unusual to see the authorizing committees
involved in the review of supplemental appropriation requests,
as historically only the appropriation committees reviewed
these requests.
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concurrent discussions on the Dire Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations request. This request was initially to cover
other expenses deemed to be emergency in nature. If funded,
these expenditures would not trigger automatic cuts in
spending because the BEA of 1990 allowed supplemental funding
as long as Congress and the President agreed that the expenses
were emergent. During the discussions on this bill, and in
light of the amount of contributions in the DCA, Congress
attempted to add funding to defense for munitions above those
levels that were expended during the war. [Ref. 32:p. 658]
However, these i dditional expenses were dropped during Senate
review.
There were also attempts to fund other areas outside DS/DS
that Congress felt could not wait for the next regular
appropriations bill, due in October, 1991. In view of the
BEA, including these costs in the supplemental emergency
request was the only vehicle to avoid automatic cuts. [Ref.
32:p. 657] This bill incurred strong resistance from OMB for
this very reason. OMB indicated that these added expenses
violated the agreed upon BEA spending caps. [Ref. 33:p. 728]
Any spending exceeding these budget ceilings would eventually
trigger automatic cuts.
The eventual outcome of the bill was a $5.4 billion
appropriation, with $655 million appropriated for an expanded
package for the Gulf War veterans. [Ref. 33:p. 728] However,
the only appropriations to come from the DCA was the $655
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million for veteran's benefits- Also included in the Dire
Emergency Act was $650 million for aid to Israel and $200
million for aid to Turkey.
In July, the President transmitted the second FY 1991
supplemental request to Congress. This request sought $2.9
billion to cover the additional FY 1991 incremental costs of
the war. It also requested authority to transfer $6.573
billion appropriated in the first supplemental from FY 1991 to
FY 1992. [Ref. 34] This request is currently under
congressional review.
With this last supplemental request, a total of $49.2
billion had been requested to cover the incremental costs of
the war, and $46.3 billion had been appropriated.
B. ACCOUNTING STRUCTURE ESTABLISHED FOR DS/DS
As mentioned above, the first unique account established
for the conflict was the Defense Cooperation Account (DCA).
This account was developed from an already existing 1954 law
which allowed individuals to contribute to national defense
via the National Defense Conditional Gift Fund. These
contributions would be directly provided to the defense
department accounts that the Secretary of Treasury deemed
appropriate to meet the intent stipulated by the donor.
However, there is no congressional review or approval required
prior to the transfer of funds to defense accounts.
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The administration attempted to tighten up the language of
the law by requesting that SECDEF be responsible for this
account rather than the Secretary of Treasury. This would
allow the SECDEF to decide how best to use the funds donated.
Congress showed great skepticism for this approach. This was
reflected in their decision on how to operate the DCA as
discussed earlier.
During the early phases of the conflict, when the
international community began providing significant funds to
offset the U.S.'s costs of the conflict, there was a need to
ensure integrity in accounting for how contributions were
used. Although Congress created the Defense Cooperation
Account, there was concern over unlimited access to these
funds. [Ref. 25:p. 3] This concern may have resulted from the
mismanagement of funds highlighted during the Iran-Contra
affair or from concern that the administration might use the
funds to break the 1990 Budget Agreement. Regardless of the
supporting arguments, Congress elected to restrict the use of
these funds to only those levels properly authorized and
appropriated.
By the end of December 1990, foreign contributions had
reached $4.5 billion, and it appeared the remaining pledges
would be honored. Table IV provides a listing of DCA balances
by month and Figure 3 provides a schematic of how the funds
were transferred using the account structure.
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TABLE IV. DEFENSE COOPERATION ACCOUNT BALANCE
(IN MILLIONS)
DATE BALANCE OF DCA TOTAL INTEREST
TRANSFERRED TO GENERATED TO
DoD ACCOUNTS DATE
OCT 17, 90 750 NONE NONE
OCT 31, 90 1,626 NONE NONE
NOV 30, 90 3,908 NONE .7
DEC 31, 90 4,260 1,000 15.9
JAN 31, 91 5,323 1,000 17.7
FEB 20, 91 12,175 1,000 48.8
MAR 19, 91 16,914 1,000 80.2
APR 12, 91 28,990 1,000 93.8
MAY 13, 91 32,035 28,100 270.4
JUN 12, 91 37,810 28,700 307.3
JUL 15, 91 39,050 33,192 332.3
AUG 15, 91 41,239 34,141 359.7
SEP 15, 91 42,454 34,641 398.3
Source: DoD reports produced by the Office of the
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Figure 3 - Schematic of Account Structure
As the conflict progressed, the tempo of military
operations increased. Operations accounts were depleted more
rapidly than expected. In late 1990, Congress was
increasingly concerned with rising projections in incremental
costs and questioned if foreign contributions were sufficient.
Congress also discussed what mechanisms would be required to
fund these additional costs. Concern over sharing the burden
of the war and how to best appropriate and account for the
costs of the conflict became central in the debate over
granting the President authority to use force against Iraq.
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In view of this, and prior to submitting a formal
supplemental request, the administration continued to
negotiate with allies and coalition members to increase their
financial contributions and commitments. There were reports
that after the start of hostilities the administration began
negotiations with various countries and utilized a formula to
develop the financial burden each country should assume. [Ref.
35:p. A17] The formula called for Japan to provide twenty
perc "t of the cost, the U.S. and other allies to provide
twenty percent, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide sixty
percent. Although reported in press, interviews with key
personnel involved in establishing the correct levels of
financial responsibilities indicated that they had not used
any particular formulm. [Per 22]
This second round of negotiations seemed very successful
and resulted in a substantial increase in commitments.
Contributions increased from about $10 billion to almost $45
billion. This eased congressional tension concerning how and
who would pay for the war. Tables V and VI provide a summary
of the balance of cash and in-kind assistance in commitments
and actual contributions received from foreign countries and
highlights the dramatic increase in contribution commitments
in early 1991.
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TABLE V. FOREIGN CASH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE U.S.
(IN BILLIONS)
DATE PLEDGE TO DATE RECEIVED TO DATE
DEC 31, 90 7.132 4.560
APR 19, 91 49.132* 30.210
APR 25, 91 49.640 31.335
MAY 14, 91 49.273 32.035
JUN 13, 91 49.179 37.810
JUL 12, 91 48.214 39.050
AUG 13, 91 48.259 41.238
SEP 12, 91 48.202 42.454
- Total pledges received for 1991 were $44.817 billion,
with estimated cash of $42 billion and in-kind assistance
covering the remaining $2.8 billion.
Source: DoD monthly cost reports and CRS documents.
Although it appears there were drops in cash contributions
in some months, this was the result of not being able to
identify the exact amount of in-kind assistance which was
included in the pledges.
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TABLE VI. FOREIGN IN-KIND ASSISTANCE TO THE U.S.
(in billions)
DATE PLEDGE TO DATE RECEIVED TO DATE
DEC 31, 90 2.608 1.257
MAR 31, 91 4.917 4.763
APR 30, 91 5.289 5.117
MAY 31, 91 5.470 5.298
JUN 30, 91 5.738 5.430
JUL 31, 91 5.693 5.454
AUG 31, 91 5.755 5.519
Source: DoD monthly cost reports and CRS documents. Although
the reports listed receipt of in-kind assistance to date,
there were recognized delays in the reporting of in-kind
assistance.
Another unique account was the Persian Gulf Regional
Defense Fund. This was created in the first FY 1991 Defense
Supplemental Appropriation. As previously discussed, it was
not the account that OMB had requested, but it did serve as a
"bridge loan" if funds in the DCA were inadequate. If funds
were drawn from this account, they would be replaced as funds
were deposited in the DCA. The only exception to this was the
appropriation of $320.5 million to Operation Provide Comfort
in July 1991. These funds were used in the Kurdish relief
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effort. Any funds not used in this account revert back to the
treasury.
An interesting sidelight regarding this account is
provided by the treatment of the incremental fuel cost
requests. Congress allowed DoD to recoup the incremental fuel
costs associated with the oil price increases during DS/DS
(recall the discussion on incremental fuel costs provided in
Chapter III) . However, Congress would not allow the DoD
forces not involved with the Persian Gulf Conflict to fund
their incremental fuel expenses from the Persian Gulf Regional
Defense Fund. Instead, price increases for non DS/DS DoD
participants could only be drawn from the DCA. DoD units
involved in the Persian Gulf Conflict were able to fund their
above budget fuel usage and the incremental fuel price
increase from either account if required. In actuality, this
restriction was never constraining. With increased foreign
contributions, the DCA provided ample funds.
The unique accounting structure established to handle
foreign contributions and subsequently disburse funds to DoD
accounts was considered successful and accomplished its
purpose. Similar off budget accounting and funding procedures
may be required again, not only for the funding of similar
future conflicts, but to monitor spending and use of funds set
aside for a particular account.
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C. GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GROUP
The account structure developed for handling foreign
contributions was not the only new procedure established
during the conflict. There were also mechanisms established
to encourage economic assistance to countries economically
impacted by the economic sanctions against Iraq.
One such measure was the Gulf Crisis Financial
Coordination Group (GCFCG). President Bush established this
activity to encourage allied countries to contribute to
frontline countries requiring economic assistance. The U.S.
Treasury Department was charged with tracking the allied
commitments and verifying the disbursements. The Treasury
department held a conference among the various donor
countries, the IMF, and World Bank members to encourage
participation and support for this type assistance.
In January of 1991, there had been a total of $13.1
billion in pledges and $6 billion had been disbursed to the
frontline countries. In August of 1991, the total amount
pledged increased to $16.1 billion and $8.9 billion had been
disbursed. Most recently, the balance of pledges is $16.2
billion with $10.6 billion in disbursements. Expectations are
that the remaining pledges will be disbursed by the end of the
1991, based on a schedule of payments agreed on by the donor
countries. This information is presented in the table below,
which highlights the commitments and disbursement of funds to
frontline countries.
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Figure 4 - Economic Assistance to Frontline Countries
One interesting item to note is the detail to which public
information is available on the exact amount of assistance to
each country. The sensitivity of openly reporting the
specific amount provided to each country has required that
only the aggregate numbers be disclosed. If numbers were
reported country by country, it would create a constant debate
over differences in amounts each country received, or did not
receive, as compared to other countries. While this did not
impact U.S. budget issues, it was a unique process executed by
the administration providing another vehicle to solicit world
support and monitor its success.
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D. INVOKING THE FEED AND FORAGE ACT
There were other unique and unusual actions taken to
ensure funding was available for the Persian Gulf Conflict.
One of the mechanisms enacted to fund emergent DoD
requirements was the Feed and Forage Act.
The Act is 1861 Civil War legislation, popularly referred
to as the Food and Forage Act. The Act allows the military to
expend funds beyond those allocated for daily operations
requirements. The Act was primarily designed to ensure that
military forces received adequate food and water for personnel
and feed for their horses, reflecting the daily operating
concerns of then current military forces.
During DS/DS the Act was invoked on two separate
nrvcasions. The first was on August 24, 1990, just after
operations in the Middle East began. Operations and
maintenance accounts (O&M) were being depleted rapidly for all
DoD agencies and military departments. This was not
unexpected because the operation began in the last part of the
fiscal year and most funds were obligated through FY 90.
The second time the Act was invoked was in February of
1991., due once again to the rapid pace at which the O&M
accounts were being expended. At the current rate, yearly
funding levels would be consumed by March or April. Invoking
the Act allowed DoD to over-obligate during DS/DS, and
subsequently submit defense supplemental appropriation
requests to cover the over-obligations. At this time, the
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Act was primarily invoked for the Army and Marine Corps O&M
accounts.
Prior to DS/DS this Act was last invoked in 1982, due to
a very precipitous rise in fuel prices occurring late in the
fiscal year. [Ref. 3 6:p. 27] The Act had also been invoked
several times during the Vietnam War. During testimony before
the House Budget Committee on the FY 1992 Defense Budget, the
DoD Comptroller described the limitations of the Act as it
applied to modern military forces and the specific categories
of DoD accounts authorized to over obligate under this
Act.[Ref. 3 6 :p. 11] Appendix C contains the DoD
Comptroller's written description of how the Act was used, as
provided to the House Budget Committee.
It is clear from congressional questions during this
meeting that there was concern over using such a dated law.
Specifically mentioned was the fact the Act was not written
for modern purposes and it appeared to lack the appropriate
congressional oversight. [Ref. 36:p. 27] The counter the DoD
Controller and the Deputy Secretary of Defense made to this
concern was the fact that the Act is rarely used. If invoked,
supplemental appropriation requests are forwarded shortly
after invoking the Act. Also, although invoked twice during
DS/DS, the Act is not generally linked to participation in a
conflict. Although the law appears antiquated, it was
effectively used to continue operations, avoiding the
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possibility that congressional delay might stop operations.
As a Congressional Research Service report stated:
The invocation of the act allowed the continuation of
operations without the thoughts of operations coming to a
grinding halt due to congressional inaction. [Ref. 2 1:p. 6]
Another unique event after DS/DS was the creation of
monthly cost reports and the requirements on what was to be
included in the reports. This is the subject of the next
chapter.
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V. ANALYSIS OF POSTWAR COST ESTIMATES
This chapter will examine the cost reports produced after
the war, analyzing the effectiveness of these reports in
measuring the marginal costs of the war. Until this point,
the thesis has presented the budget climate at the start of
the crisis and discussed the early cost estimates developed by
DoD/OMB, CBO, and GAO, particularly the difficulty encountered
in providing these incremental cost estimates. The funding
mechanisms employed during the conflict and the timelines
associated with decisions supporting these mechanisms have
also been discussed. This chapter will first discuss the
background behind the creation of the monthly cost reports and
the shift in oversight focus on cost reports. Then, it will
analyze the actual cost data reported, the accrual cost
forecast, and the valuation of in-kind assistance included in
the report.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF COST REPORTS
As the war concluded, DoD continued to develop and refine
cost estimates of the total DS/DS incremental costs.
Congressional action in the FY 1991 DS/DS Supplemental
Appropriation Act required DoD to provide accurate monthly
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cost reports on actual costs accounted for to date and updated
estimates for possible future incremental costs. [Ref. 31]
These reports were initiated in April of 1991 and the
first OMB cost report was forwarded on April 20, 1991. [Ref.
37] The reports presented the total incremental cost of the
conflict to date to account for the expenditure of those
supplemental funds authorized and appropriated for the
conflict. Per congressional direction, these reports also
included the most current figures on foreign contributions,
both cash and in-kind assistance.
The format chosen for these cost reports was unique.
Although funding was provided via normal appropriation
accounts, the actual cost reports were not formatted by these
categories. They were formatted on aggregate levels under
general categories determined by Congress. The specific
categories were developed jointly by the House Budget and the
House Armed Services Committee.[Ref. 38] These cost
categories and definitions are listed below: [Ref. 30]
1. Airlift: costs related to the transportation by air of
personnel, equipment, and supplies.
2. Sealift: costs related to the transportation by sea of
personnel, equipment, and supplies.
3. Personnel: pay and allowances of members of the reserve
components of the armed forces called or ordered to active
duty and the increased pay and allowances of members of the
regular components of the armed forces incurred because of
deployment in connection with operations in the Persian Gulf.
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4. Personnel Support: subsistence, uniforms, and medical
costs.
5. Operating Support: equipment support costs, costs
associated with increased operational tempo, spare parts,
stock fund purchases, communications, and equipment
maintenance.
6. Fuel: the additional fuel required for higher operating
tempo and for airlift and sealift transportation of personnel
and equipment as well as the higher price for fuel during the
period.
7. Procurement: ammunition, weapon systems improvements
and upgrades, and equipment purchases.
8. Military Construction: the costs of constructing
temporary billets for troops, and administrative, supply and
maintenance facilities.
These reports were designed to provide the incremental
costs associated with DS/DS and the status of foreign
contributions to offset the costs of the war. The report
format provided the total incremental costs for three
different time periods and to date: 1) August to September
1990, 2) October to December 1990, 3) the costs collected
during the month before last (i.e., costs collected through
July were reported in September) and 4) the total costs to
date. The cost reports are provided in aggregate numbers for
each of the eight categories described above and in detail for
each category. Within each category, the costs are divided
into the amount of costs associated with each of the military
departments and defense agencies. Appendix D provides a copy
of the September 15, 1991 cost report provided by OMB.
The second portion of information provided is foreign
contributions. These reports include the commitments or
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pledges made and the total amount received to date. The
information was further divided into the cash contribution and
in-kind assistance provided by each country, listing the
amount pledged and the actual receipt of these commitments by
country for both 1990 and 1991. Following this information,
there is a general description of the major type of in-kind
assistance received from each country providing significant
in-kind assistance.
Although these reports were released by OMB and required
by congressional action, they do not match the supplemental
financing requirements of DS/DS. The cost reports provide the
total DoD incremental cost of the war. The total incremental
war cost, as reported by OMB, contains several costs not
included in the supplemental funding requirements as indicated
on the cover sheet of each OMB report. Some of these include:
the costs incurred between August and September 1990, costs
covered by in-kind assistance from allies and frontline
states, and costs offset by the realignment, reprogramming, or
transfer of funds appropriated for activities unrelated to the
Persian Gulf Conflict. Also included in the cost reports, but
not in the supplemental funding request, were the costs
associated with expended munitions or destroyed equipment that
may not be replaced because of the planned drawdown of
military force levels. Table VII provides the total
incremental cost estimates contained in the reports.
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TABLE VII. POSTWAR OMB/DoD MONTHLY COST ESTIMATES
(IN BILLIONS)
OMB MONTHLY PRELIMINARY FORECAST OFFSETTING OFFSETTING
COST REPORTS COST TOTAL COST COST
ESTIMATE TO DoD COST REDUCTION REDUCTION
DATE (1) OF WAR FOR FOR IN-
REALIGNMENT KIND
ASSISTANCE
#I/APR 20, 91 13.189 60 1.305 1.257
(AUG90-DEC90)
#2/APR 27, 91 31.574 60 3.119 3.875
(AUG90-FEB91)
#3/MAY 15, 91 36.115 60 3.265 4.763
(AUG90-MAR91)
#4/JUN 15, 91 39.995 60 1.029 5.116
(AUG90-APR91)
#5/JUL 15, 91 42.194 61 .972 5.298
(AUG90-MAY91)
#6/AUG 15, 91 44.197 61 1.029 5.419
(AUG90-JUN91)
#7/SEP 15, 91 45.336 61.1(2) 1.029 5.454(3)
(AUG90-JUL91) I
NOTE (1): These costs were those costs incurred during the
timeframe indicated and projected costs for equipment repair.
Also, phasedown and redeployment costs incurred to date were
included. However, costs such as continued operations in the
area, equipment repair not yet identified, and long-term
benefit and disability costs were forecast and are reflected
in the total forecast cost column.
NOTE (2): Although $61 billion was the estimated total cost of
the war, the offsetting reductions from estimated in-kind
assistance ($5.8 billion), internal realignment ($1 billion),
material not requiring replacement ($1.2 billion), and the
costs associated with long-term benefits/disabilities to be
considered later ($3.9 billion), reduced the total funding
cost requirement to $49.2 billion.
NOTE (3): Current estimates project in-kind assistance to
read 3. billion.
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The total costs estimated for DS/DS in these reports were
preliminary and represented full incremental costs of the
conflict. The reports include estimates of costs for such
items as: 1) equipment repair, rehabilitation, and restoration
due to high operating rates and combat use, 2) the phasedown
of operations and 3) the return deployment of military forces.
The reports recognize the uncertainties of estimating
these future costs. Furthermore, costs that cannot be
accurately estimated at the time of the report are excluded
(i.e., unidentified equipment repair, rehabilitation and
restoration requirements, long-term benefits and disability
costs, and the costs of continuing operations in the region).
With these concerns in mind, DOD estimated total
incremental costs at $60 billion in the second OMB report [Ref.
39] and then raised this estimate to $61 billion in the fifth
report. [Ref. 40] Of this total, only $49.2 billion represents
funding requirements for the war. As discussed in the second
FY 1991 defense supplemental appropriation request, the
following costs were not included in the request: [Ref. 34]
- $5.8 billion of total incremental cost which would be
covered by foreign contributions in the form of in-kind
assistance.
- $1.0 billion which would be absorbed by DOD internally
through reprogramming or transfer of funds.
. $1.2 billion to be excluded for material that was expended
and will not be replaced.
- $3.9 billion for the costs associated with Veterans
benefits and related expenses to be considered later.
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With the exception of the second FY 1991 defense
supplemental appropriation request for $2.9 billion, submitted
in July 1991, all the identified incremental funding
requirements have been met. Prior to the first OMB monthly
report in April, 1991, $42.6 billion had been appropriated in
the FY 1991 Defense Supplemental Bill, $2.1 billion had been
appropriated in the FY 1990 defense supplemental, $1 billion
had been appropriated in the FY 1991 defense authorization
bill, and $.6 billion was appropriated in the FY 1991 Dire
Emergency Supplemental. This brings the total appropriation
to $46.3 billion. If the final $2.9 billion request is funded
by Congress, the total defense supplemental funding for the
war will match the reported incremental costs provided in the
cost reports.
As discussed earlier, these same reports provide the
current status of foreign contributions, both cash and in-kind
assistance. As of the end of July, 1991 $40.7 billion in
foreign cash contributions had been received, with an
additional $7.7 billion anticipated. This would bring the
total foreign cash contributions to $48.4 billion.
With the exception of the $2.1 billion appropriation in
U.S. funds for the incremental costs of the war in the FY 1990
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Bill, it appears foreign
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cash contributions will meet all additional U.S. FY 1991
funding requirements for DS/DS.14
However, this did not alleviate additional discussions on
the issues associated with the estimation of DoD' s incremental
costs for future expenses associated with DS/DS.
B. SHIFT IN FOCUS ON INCREMENTAL COST OVERSIGHT
The conclusion of DS/DS brought new insights into the
political realities available in the "new world order." The
operation was described as illustrating the successful
execution of sound military strategy and the apparent optimal
use of advanced technology. As this euphoria of success swept
the country, the visibility of DoD cost estimates subsided.
Although cost estimation reports were routinely being updated,
beginning with the April 1991 OMB monthly cost report, public
support for the Gulf conflict eased political budget
considerations. Some congressional members who had previously
criticized the decision to resolve the crisis by war were
quick to capture the public sentiment and voiced little
objection to specified DoD funding requirements immediately
following the war. [Ref. 41:p. 692] This attitude during the
aftermath of the war was illustrated by the relative ease with
14 The total incremental costs are currently estimated at
$49.2 billion. The FY 1990 Defense Supplemental Appropriation
bill appropriated $2.1 billion for U.S. defense spending on
Desert Shield in 1990. The remaining $47.1 billion in funding
requirements is less than the total foreign contributions of
$48.4 billion.
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which the House and Senate passed the first FY 1991 Defense
Supplemental Appropriations Bill.
Although congressional committees and CBO reviewed DoD's
monthly estimates, there appeared little resistance to DoD's
numbers. During interviews with key personnel involved in
reviewing cost estimates for the defense oversight committees,
it was apparent there had been a shift in the focus. This
shift was not solely based on the military success and public
support, but was also fueled by the additional foreign
contributions received in early 1991. It seemed likely that
the incremental costs of the war would be funded entirely from
these contributions, but there was concern that the allies
might not meet their commitments. As stated by one member of
the HASC while discussing the concerns over foreign countries
fulfilling pledges after the successful completion of the war:
It's sort of like you're in the middle of the Jerry Lewis
Telethon then suddenly cure the disease. How many people
are going to follow up on their pledge?[Ref. 42:p. 646]
However, these concerns dissipated as funds were received and
further negotiations confirmed the intent to meet
pledges. [Ref. 22]
Congressional review, although not as intense as prior to
the war, was far from non-existent. The focus shifted from
budget funding requirements to reporting actual costs. The
focus shifted to 1) ensure correct costs were still captured
and 2) ensure that the reporting requirements developed were
followed and that the total incremental costs appeared
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reasonable. Associated with this shift in focus came a
corresponding shift in the primary oversight agencies involved
in reviewing the defense estimates.
After the war and passage of the first FY 91 defense
supplemental, oversight shifted from the congressional
oversight committees and CBO to GAO. This was not unexpected.
This transference of oversight responsibilities is normal.
The FY 92/93 Defense Budget became the next congressional
hurdle for the majority of the defense oversight committees.
However, Congress had not become completely disinterested
in cost estimates or proposed funding initiatives. As
discussed earlier, SECDEF's request to have authority to
transfer funds into DoD accounts from the DCA without
appropriation by Congress was denied. Congress continued to
require normal procedures to ensure the funds were used only
after they had been authorized and appropriated. Some
flexibility may have emerged with regard to measuring exact
incremental costs, but the process and allocation of funds
remained standard to a large extent.
C. COLLECTION OF ACTUAL COST DATA
Difficulty in defining which costs met the incremental
definition was one problem still facing the military
departments. Equally difficult was predicting the accrual
costs of the war within the required accounting structure.
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Comments prior to the war, in early January, 1991,
indicated that DoD had difficulty in obtaining good actual
cost data because there was no effective cost accounting
system. [Ref. 12 :p. 10] This was recognized within DoD prior
to DS/DS. Initiatives such as unit costing and OSD
centralization of accounting systems from each of the military
departments reflect DoD's concern with the inadequacy of the
current system. Discussing these new initiatives in detail
falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, interviews
with congressional staff members and the Chairman of the House
Budget Committee indicate that the unit costing initiative was
a required evolution in reporting costs and that it might
better support the development of incremental cost estimation
for future operations. [Ref. 38]
Not only were there concerns for the adequacy of DoD's
current accounting system from outside DoD but from within as
well. During interviews with personnel involved in developing
the actual cost estimates, there were some reservations
regarding whether DS/DS costs could be adequately captured via
the accounting system. Also, as reported in the guidance
letter from OSD to the military departments on developing the
cost estimates, the difficulty of determining the cost
estimates via the current account structure was
acknowledged. [Ref- 43] It was suggested thAat many estimates
would need to be developed manually.
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This same letter required that the cost estimates be
provided by appropriations account and in a unique format
developed within the Office of the DoD Comptroller. The
difficulty in providing these estimates became quickly
apparent during a January 4, 1991 meeting of the House Budget
Committee on the costs of Desert Storm. In his opening
remarks, the chairman of the committee mentioned his
disappointment that there was no DoD representation at the
meeting and that written estimates of war costs, promised
earlier, were never delivered. [Ref. 36:p. 4]
In retrospect, the failure to provide timely cost
estimation data may have added incentives to design the cost
categories for the monthly DoD cost reports in the first FY
1991 Defense Supplemental Authorization Bill. [Ref. 38]
Although these categories were defined in legislation, there
are still some minor changes in original cost estimates due to
incorrect cost category reporting.
One example was DoD's morale and welfare costs. In the
third OMB report to Congress, morale and welfare costs of $71
million were included in the personnel cost category. In the
fourth OMB report these morale and welfare costs were shifted
to the operating support category, reducing the costs for
personnel. This change reflected the minor modifications
required by the new cost reporting format to correspond more
closely with normal appropriation structure.
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Although some cost estimates were modified due to the
revision of the cost accounting format, the majority of
changes reflected improvements in information as time
progressed.
Also discussed in interviews with the same personnel was
the differences in the ability of each military department to
use their department unique structure to estimate incremental
costs. For example, the Navy was able to estimate increased
operations costs above budgeted baseline costs more
effectively than the other departments in the operations and
maintenance accounts (O&M) . The baseline costs assumed ships
were at sea about 45 days a quarter. Thus, the Navy was able
to determine the costs for the extra days at sea of ships
involved in DS/DS.
The Air Force and Army cost accounting systems were
somewhat different. They coded all activities associated with
DS/DS and then included all costs coded as DS/DS in the
incremental costs. This seemed adequate at the beginning of
the war. However, incremental costs should be reduced by the
offsets gained through cancellation of certain activities.
For example, since training exercises were canceled at sites
worldwide, the costs budgeted to these events should be
reduced from the DS/DS cost estimates if the participants were
not involved in the exercise due to the conflict. This
created some accounting difficulty, since all coded activities
had to be adjusted to back out all offsetting reductions.
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Another example was provided in the fourth OMB report on
the incremental costs of the war. [Ref. 44] There was a
reduction of $1.2 billion in the operating support cost
category due to a revision in the Army's accrued maintenance
costs. The original maintenance costs were overstated since
the costs were partially offset by the cancellation of almost
$1.2 billion of in-country maintenance contracts and
requisitions for repair parts and supplies.
There were also difficulties in ensuring DS/DS costs were
coded correctly into the appropriate accounts. Simple coding
misclassifications occur in normal accounting situations.
With the increased logistics support required for DS/DS, the
rate of incorrect cost coding likely increased. GAO is
responsible for reviewing these accounting mechanisms and
costs. Several press reports at the time of the GAO review
indicated incorrect coding of events. [Ref. 45] However, for
the most part, GAO personnel stated that these press reports
were exaggerated and that the number of errors due to
incorrect coding were relatively small. GAO testimony before
congressional committees stipulated that they were confident
the actual costs reported in the monthly OMB cost reports were
reasonable and accurate.
In reviewing OMB reports, most oversight committees also
agreed that the figures presented were accurate reflections of
the actual costs and were reasonable. [Ref. 46:p. 1] However,
there was still debate concerning the cost estimates of future
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costs or the accrual costs primarily associated with the
equipment refurbishment.
D. ESTIMATES OF ACCRUAL COSTS
The monthly OMB reports combine the difficult tasks of
reporting actual costs, supported by factual data, and
forecasting expenses which are extremely difficult to
accurately estimate. The majority of the debate since April
has focused on the difficult area of accrued costs. In
testimony before congressional committees, the GAO has
discussed the possibility that accrual costs have been
overstated.
DoD estimated incremental future expenses in three areas,
as mentioned before: phasedown of operations, redeployment of
forces, and equipment refurbishment. In April, 1991, DoD
estimated these costs would total $28.4 billion, including
about $16.2 billion for the cost of equipment refurbishment.
GAO questioned the equipment refurbishment estimate during
testimony on the costs of DS/DS and allied contributions
before the House Budget Committee GAO maintained that some
funds for equipment refurbishment were provided in the FY 1991
Defense Budget. Since these funds were planned for, and some
equipment did not receive maintenance when required, these
costs should offset DS/DS costs for equipment repair. Based
on inspections of equiipment used in DS/DS, GAO personnel
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further indicated that the estimated costs to refurbish may
not be as high as originally suspected.
While these costs can only be estimated, it is important
to note that accrual costs associated with equipment wear and
tear are "preliminary" in nature. Failure to capture such
costs can have a significant impact on future budgets. These
additional incremental costs would have to be absorbed in
future budgets. However, it is difficult to determine which
portion of future incremental costs are a result of DS/DS.
One technique might be to develop baselines on equipme,.t
repair normally experienced and then contrast this baseline
with the current repair levels. This might indicate the
incremental costs of equipment repair for DS/DS, but it would
not account for the baseline repair level reduction created by
the overall military drawdown.
E. VALUATION OF IN-KIND ASSISTANCE
As mentioned earlier, substantial foreign contributions
were received from allied countries, both cash and in-kind
assistance. As cost estimates were being developed early in
the crisis, the exact amount of allied in-kind assistance was
unknown. As later estimates were developed in early 1991, it
was recognized that in-kind assistance could in fact
substantially reduce the costs of the war. As of August 31,
1991, total in-kind assistance received was valued at $5.519
billion with total commitments of $5.755 billion.
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The valuation of in-kind assistance, however, was not an
easy task and represented unique challenges for DOD. As
recently stated in an Army publication:
Determining the propriety for this type of support,
capturing its monetary value, and then accounting for it
all proved to be an extensive undertaking.[Ref. 47:p. 5]
Several concerns arose regarding in-kind assistance. The
first concern was determining what type of support was needed
and valued by the forces involved in the operation and how to
coordinate delivery of this assistance to minimize negative
impacts on critical logistics pipelines. Although in-kind
assistance was primarily comprised of food, water, fuel, and
transportation, there were other items, such as military
equipment, that were offered as well. Early in the crisis,
CENTCOM, via JCS, was asked to identify which types of
assistance were and were not desired, and to specify the
urgency involved in the delivery. [Ref. 48] This ensured that
the desired assistance would be received in a timely manner.
The second issue concerned valuing the in-kind assistance.
Many countries providing supplies did not have cost systems
that enabled them to provide the exact cost of the material,
especially in the case of the frontline countries. Other
countries simply would not provide the value of the in-kind
assistance. Many times the value was estimated by the prices
the U. S. military paid for like material.'5  For budgetary
'5 Some general guidelines DoD used in valuing in-kind
assistance are included in Appendix E.
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purposes, it is important to note that cost avoidance to the
U.S. is the appropriate measure of value (e.g., what the U.S.
would have paid if it were not provided). This alleviates the
requirement for foreign countries to estimate the value of in-
kind assistance. However, from a burden sharing perspective,
the opportunity cost to the providing country is important,
not the price or cost-avoidance value required for budgetary
concerns.
The third issue concerned how best to report contributions
of in-kind assistance. This issue was especially sensitive
early in the war when it was important not to provide our
adversaries potentially useful information on what materials
were and were not being delivered. In addition, some donor
countries did not want to be recognized publicly for their
contributions, due to political sensitivities. [Ref. 48]
Finally, in the U. S., there was no standardized system or
routine methods to account for in-kind assistance. Most
reports were generated manually and there were time delays in
reporting these contributions because of confusion over how to
report the details required.
As concerns over costs became keener in early 1991, there
were increased demands for more current value estimates.
These values were demanded so that budgetary cost estimates
provided for the conflict could accurately account for the
offsetting contributions in in-kind assistance. GAO
specifically commented that the time delays incurred by DoD
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review of in-kind assistance reports from CENTCOM were
hindering their cost estimate development. By law, these
reports and estimates had to be provided to GAO to allow it to
fulfill its legal obligation to audit contributions accepted
by DoD. [Ref. 12:p. 9]
This chapter has examined the postwar cost reports being
provided by OMB/DoD to congressional defense oversight
committees. It is obvious that while earlier prewar estimates
attempted to capture incremental costs, there were
difficulties both in definition of costs and in cost
collection. With the completion of the war, actual cost data
became more precise but forecasting future incremental costs
continued to be difficult. There were differences in opinion
on how best to forecast these costs, leading to different
incremental cost estimates.
The next chapter explores the future budgetary impact of
DS/DS and the feasibility of utilizing the unique funding
mechanisms discussed within this thesis for future events.
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VI. FUTURE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF DS/DS
The Persian Gulf conflict has affected the U.S. in several
areas. These are the focus of this chapter. The first part
of the chapter deals with the effect DS/DS has had on the U.S.
economy, the federal deficit, and the U.S. defense budget.
The second part of the chapter discusses the usefulness of the
unique funding mechanisms adopted during DS/DS and their
possible application in the future.
A. EFFECT ON U.S. ECONOMY AND BUDGET DEFICIT
1. U. S. Economy
The Iraq-Kuwait crisis was a factor contributing to
the recession in the later half of 1990. The slowdown in U.S.
economic activity resulted at least in part from the higher
oil prices created because of the invasion. While large
petroleum and natural gas inventories and the relatively mild
weather in the U.S. softened the effect of this price shock,
the crisis resulted in a drop of almost one percent in the
Gross National Product (GNP). [Ref. 16:p. 12]
However, with the outbreak of hostilities, the price
of oil declined sharply. Additionally, military spending
increased in FY 1991, with the added spending created by
DS/DS, and the stock market improved following the successful
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conclusion of the war. These factors may have reversed many
of the negative effects on the U.S. economy initially created
by the Middle East crisis. Thus, the earlier concerns over
the effect of the war on the economy have greatly diminished.
2. Budget Deficit - 1991
However, there are continued concerns regarding the
potential impact the war will have on the federal deficit.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was designed to limit
spending to contain the growth of the deficit. However, it
allowed for emergency spending without violating spending
caps- During debates over which incremental costs to be
designated as emergency spending, it became clear that
emergencies could quickly become a routine loophole to avoid
budget enforcement consequences. Part of the success of the
Act lies in interpreting FY 1991 results.
As discussed earlier in the thesis, deficit figures
for FY 1991 are in fact lower than expected. However, the
primary reasons for the smaller expected deficits were the
unexpectedly large foreign contributions for DS/DS and the
delay in the bailout of the Savings and Loan crisis.
It appears that foreign cash contributions will cover
all of DoD's incremental costs of the war for FY 1991.
However, there are other federal expenses not covered by
foreign contributions or offset by incremental savings. For
example, debt forciveness to Egypt, financial aid to frontline
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countries in the war, and other postwar policies may add to
federal spending.16  These costs are above what would have
been provided to these countries under normal conditions.
Thus, they are a direct result of DS/DS. Although these
expenses may be classified as emergency appropriations, this
only alleviates the issue of exceeding spending caps and
avoiding automatic cuts. These additional costs will add to
the federal deficit.
Early in the war, the Director of the Taxpayer Assets
Project, an independent organization, estimated the total
quantifiable costs of the conflict under three different
scenarios. 7 These estimates attempted to capture both DoD
and non-DoD costs as well as the costs associated with higher
oil prices and the drop in GNP. Table VIII is an example of
one such estimate included in the report.
1 As discussed earlier in the thesis, Egypt received
relief from $7 billion in military debt, while Israel and
Turkey received economic aid of $850 million.
" This report was prepared by Mr James P. Love, the
Director of the Taxpayer Assets Project, with the assistance
of CBO analyst, Mr Mike O'Hanlon.
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TABLE VIII. TOTAL QUANTIFIABLE COSTS OF WAR
(IN BILLIONS)
COST CATEGORY ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
OF ECONOMIC (1) (2) (3)
SANCTIONS
DIRECT COSTS 10 35 35 70
OF DEPLOYMENT
OR WAR
COSTS OF 5 15 30
OCCUPATION
RECONSTRUCTION - 5 5 7
AID
AID TO OTHER 5 5 15 25
COUNTRIES
ADDED SECURITY - 1 2 4
COSTS
OIL PRICES 21 15 19 22
NATURAL GAS 10 4 4 4
PRICES
GNP LOSS 29 21 26 31
TOTAL 75 89 121 193
SCENARIO (1): LOW COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY LOW WORLD POLITICAL
TENSIONS AND SHORT OCCUPATION.
SCENARIO (2): LOW COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY INCREASED WORLD
POLITICAL TENSIONS AND DIFFICULT OCCUPATION.
SCENARIO (3): HIGH COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY GREATER WORLD
POLITICAL TENSIONS AND VERY DIFFICULT OCCUPATION.
Source: Taxpayers Assets Project Report, February 6, 1991,
prepared by the Director, Mr Love with assistance from CBO.
Included in the same report was an assessment of the
war's impact on the budget deficit within the framework of the
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same three scenarios used to estimate total costs. Table IX
provides these estimates. These estimates exclude foreign
contributions, but include direct government costs plus loss
of tax revenue due to the reduction in GNP caused by higher
energy prices.
TABLE IX. ESTIMATED IMPACT OF WAR COSTS ON DEFICIT
(IN BILLIONS)
SPECIFIC SCENARIO INCREASE IN
I DEFICIT
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 33
(1) LOW COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY LOW 77
WORLD POLITICAL TENSIONS AND SHORT
OCCUPATION
(2) LOW COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY 100
INCREASED WORLD POLITICAL TENSIONS AND
DIFFICULT OCCUPATION
(3) HIGH COST WAR ACCOMPANIED BY GREATER 163
WORLD POLITICAL TENSIONS AND VERY
DIFFICULT OCCUPATION
Source: Taxpayers Assets Project Report, February 6,
1991, prepared by the Director, Mr Love with assistance
from CBO.
These cost estimates only provide a rough estimate of
future expenses for a particular scenario. However, they show
that there will be an impact on the deficit. Foreign
contributions will only offset some of the total incremental
costs (i.e., DoD direct incremental costs). Whether these
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costs are as significant as the costs that would have been
incurred if the U.S. had elected to not enter the war is
unknown.
3. Budget Deficit - Beyond 1991
Near-term costs were not the only issue surrounding
the war. There were also concerns over the future costs of
the war voiced by CBO, GAO, and Congress. These additional
future costs that were unclear now could impact the future
federal deficit.
In February, 1991, CBO presented testimony to Congress
expressing concerns over postwar policy costs, such as
maintaining U.S. military forces in the Gulf and
reconstruction and aid for Gulf countries. [Ref. 12:pp. 16-24]
For example, the U.S. has historically provided substantial
aid to war-damaged countries. The figure below depicts the
economic assistance provided to countries following conflicts
involving the U.S. and is based on a report by the Taxpayers
Assets Project Report discussed earlier.
87








0 6 ' 0 12 14 16 1'8 20 22 24
DOLLARS (IN BILLIONS)
1. THIS WAS FOR SMALLER COUNTRIES (GRENADA, PANAMA, ETC).
Figure 5 - History of U.S. Postwar Aid
However, there is reason to believe that U.S.
reconstruction aid may be more limited in this instance. In
the case of Iraq, Congress specifically stipulated that any
assistance to Iraq would only be provided if Saddam Hussein
were no longer in power. [Ref. 49:p. 23] Also, this conflict
is unique because many countries involved have valuable oil
resources. They can provide assistance to other less fortunate
nations affected by the war, reducing reliance on the U.S. for
economic support.
Another area of postwar policy debate centers on the
costs of maintaining U.S. forces in the gulf. Not only will
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there be continued costs to maintain forces in the region,
but the requirement to maintain these forces may limit planned
reductions in military personnel. If this occurs, then there
are additional costs which will impact the defense budget and
the deficit.
Although the postwar policies required to ensure
stability in the region are unclear at this time, there will
be some additional costs. Whether these costs affect future
budget deficits will depend on the extent of these costs and
whether future federal budgets and DoD budgets can accommodate
them.
The unique economic status of many of the frontline
countries involved, and their apparent intentions to assist
less fortunate frontline states, indicate that there may be
little impact on the U.S. budget deficit. This, coupled with
a resurgence of the U.S. economy, may minimize deficit
spending.
In testimony in February, CBO stated that there may be
a small increase in the 1992 federal deficit and that the war
should not interfere with the sharp decline in federal
deficits expected after 1992. [Ref. 12:p. 15] However, while
DS/DS may not impact future deficits, a recent report by CBO
estimates that earlier projected declines in the federal
deficit will not be as sharp as predicted. (Ref. 50:p. 1] In
fact, recent estimates project the deficit to be large and to
continue through fiscal year 2001, with the smallest expected
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deficit to be $189 billion in FY 1995, growing to $313 billion
in FY 2001. .is estimate assumes that discretionary spending
will remain within the limits established in the BEA through
FY 1995. If however, these discretionary spending caps are
removed without any compensating restrictions, it is projected
the deficit would reach its lowest level in FY 1992, at about
$236 billion, and could climb to $418 billion by FY 2001.
B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF DS/DS
1. Political Implications
The new world order has survived its first challenge.
While this may lead to an optimistic picture of the future
world environment, it must be framed within the context of the
reality of this particular conflict. Saddam Hussein was the
ideal man to test the new world resolve. With the universal
perception of an immoral dictator destroying an unprotected
neighbor, it was easier to rally forces to oppose this
aggressive behavior.
Will future regional conflicts support such a strong
collection of world opinion and resolve? While this will
ultimately be answered over time, there are important
political implications for U.S. policy abroad and for the U.S.
defense budget in general.
This conflict may not be typical, and in fact was
probably atypical. However, the funding of U.S. war costs by
other nations poses special considerations for future foreign
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policy. While many countries offered assistance, both cash
contributions and in-kind assistance, some restrictions were
placed on using the donations. For example, Japan requested
that their contributions be earmarked for transportation, but
not for combat forces.[Ref. 28:p. 10] While this was
impractical to implement during DS/DS it pre-ents interesting
questions for the future. Will the U.S. allow caveats to be
placed on contributions. If not, will Allies be reluctant to
provide cash and instead contribute more in-kind assistance?
Another political question facing the U.S. concerns
the future participation and cooperation by U.N. members. For
example, the U.S. was able to rally U.N. support for this
conflict. If U.N. support does not continue in the future,
will the U.S. conduct its policy despite U.N. apathy, or will
U.N. apathy dictate U.S. national security policy?
Apparent changes in burden sharing attitudes of allied
countries are also important. Have precedents been set for
determining xesponsibility sharing levels in future conflicts?
What costs are appropriate for determining the portion of the
burden each country has born? While these future implications
are important, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.e
18 For further discussion of these issues, see "Cost
Estimation for Desert Shield/Desert .Storm - A Burden Sharing
Viewpoint", by LT Brian F-i'!ey, Ma toro Thscic, Naval
Postgraduate School, December 1991.
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2. Defense Budget Implications
There are numerous political implications that warrant
significant study. However, one issue is particularly
relevant for this thesis. This issue involves the appropriate
cost measures to use in trade-offs regarding future budgetary
decisions over force structure and posture.
DS/DS has provided an opportunity to evaluate, test,
and operate current combat systems on the battlefield. The
lessons learned are significant and will better prepare our
military forces for any future conflicts. These lessons
learned point out future directions for the defense budget.
Already there are efforts to capture these lessons learned and
include them in budget decisions. [Ref. 49:p. 11] As stated
during testimony to the House Budget Committee prior to the
war:
The relatively short-term accounting exercise of
segregation of the costs of Operation Desert Shield from
other normal DoD operations should not obscure the longer-
term issues raised by the crisis in the Gulf and the U.S.
deployment. [Ref. 15:p. 11]
This war has emphasized the need to prepare for
regional conflicts. Military forces must be light, mobile,
lethal and fully trained to conduct operations worldwide. The
conflict suggests that future conflicts will be "come as you
are wars."[Ref. 51:p. 4] Executing this policy requires
that whatever forces are deployed to the area must not be
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"hollow forces" and cannot rely on time to develop into the
force required.
While DoD is attempting to develop these forces, there
are hard decisions currently being made on defense budgets,
realizing that the impact of these decisions will only be
tested in time. Issues associated with lift, manpower, stock
levels, hardware and reserve-active force integration are
being debated today as a result of the war. While this thesis
will not discuss these issues, these decisions do highlight
that as budgets are reduced, incremental cost estimation or
marginal cost concepts will be involved in making trade-offs
in the defense budget.
C. FUTURE OF FUNDING MECHANISMS USED IN DS/DS
There were unique funding mechanisms and innovative
actions taken during DS/DS. Following is a discussion with
regard to future feasibility of these actions.
1. Feed and Forage Act
Although the Act was initially created in 1861, it
provided the flexibility to continue critical operations while
awaiting supplemental funding. However, Congress was
concerned over the lack of oversight in the decision to invoke
the Act. GAO budget analysts indicated that there was some
sentiment to revise the Act to reflect more modern forces'
needs and requirements. For example, the Act could be
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specifically updated to provide a list of those items that
fall under the Act.
However, in view of the strict definition (Appendix C)
used by DoD in invoking the Act, this revision does not seem
to be necessary. The Act, as it stands now, provides the
flexibility needed to support operations. Any revision could
lead to less flexibility and increased congressional
oversight.
2. Funding Account Structure
Another unique procedure used during DS/DS was the
fund account structure established to receive foreign
contributions. This account, DCA, provided a solution to
ensure foreign funding of DoD required accounts. The DCA
account structure and oversight involved appeared to have
convinced foreign contributors that only appropriate military
costs were funded out of their contributions. While SECDEF
and the administration did not receive the control of funds
they desired, DCA in conjunction with the "bridge loan"
account (Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund) did ensure that
funding was available for DoD accounts as required.
With the changes in world cooperation and the
continued threat of regional instability in various parts of
the world, these account structures may be used again. In
view of this, these accounts must provide adequate oversight
to reassure contributors of our ability to manage funding.
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3. In-Kind Assistance
Another unique exercise involved the valuation of in-
kind assistance. This proved to be a very difficult task for
DoD resource managers. Highlighting these difficulties was
the lack of standardized reporting on in-kind assistance.
Additionally, the ability to estimate the donating country's
cost of providing assistance was very difficult. However, in
order to recognize the offsetting reduction in U.S.
incremental spending and cost-avoidance, these estimates are
required.
It would be easier from a budgeting perspective to
collect the contributions in cash and thereby have some
baseline to measure different countries' contributions.
However, the value of in-kind assistance can create
flexibility not available in cash contributions. In the
Persian Gulf, the availability of fuel was a great benefit for
allied forces as it eased the logistical pipeline that would
have been required if the fuel was not available.
In-kind assistance also has political advantages. It
allows countries to donate resources while avoiding the
political difficulties of the formal allocation process which
usually accompanies cash contributions. There are political
disadvantages as well. If the donating country specifies the
value of the material or assistance, it is difficult to
disagree with their estimate or conduct an audit of their cost
system.
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While there were concerns with some estimated values
of in-kind assistance, the information in the monthly cost
reports appears to be adequate. However, these reports
provided postwar information. In future conflicts where in-
kind assistance is substantial, earlier more accurate reports
may be required to meet concerns voiced by GAO, CBO, and
Congress. In view of this, the development of standardized
reports on in-kind assistance could be created to provide the
details of the in-kind assistance and still protect the
sensitivities involved with releasing the information
publicly. Efforts to develop these procedures could be
jointly conducted by GAO and OSD. While this procedure may
aid in ensuring that the incremental costs of future conflicts
capture the offsetting value of in-kind assistance, there are
still the inherent problems in exact value determination
discussed above.
4. Monthly Cost Reports
The last area to discuss is the unique monthly cost
reports requested by Congress. While the format initially
seemed awkward and required manipulation of current accessible
information, the reports provided a clearer picture of actual
costs and those estimated costs developed to date. They also
provided a corresponding picture of foreign commitments and
the degree to which these commitments had been fulfilled.
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While OMB is providing the reports as requested, there
is the opportunity to modify these reports to better match
current accounting systems and ease the reporting efforts.
This revie.; may be controversial at this time, in view of the
congressional concern for incremental costs driving the
reports. However, it might be advantageous to revise the
report and submit an example of this revised report with one
of the normal reports prior to the last report in November
1992. This would allow congressional review and development
of an approved report that better supported the accounting
system for any similar circumstance in the future.
Presented within the cost reports was the actual
incremental cost data and expected future incremental costs in
each category. As discussed earlier, there was concern over
whether DoD's accounting system could accurately estimate
these costs. There were also inferences on the advantages of
the unit costing initiatives for these purposes. [Ref. 38]
However, it appears that unit costing may develop the average
cost of the item and not reflect marginal costs. Therefore,
this system may not necessarily enhance incremental cost
estimation for budgetary requirements. This topic would be an
ideal subject for a separate thesis study.
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VII. CONCLUSION
From the data presented in this thesis, it appears that
foreign commitments for cash contributions will cover DoD
funding requirements for DS/DS. Total foreign commitments are
$48.3 billion, with $42.5 billion collected as of September
11, 1991. Total DoD estimated funding requirements are $47.1
billion. Adding the $400 million in funding required by the
Department of State, Education, and Veterans Affairs, brings
the total funding requirement to $47.5 billion, $800 million
below foreign commitments. While total incremental costs to
DoD may reach $61.1 billion19, actual DoD funding
requirements of $47.1 billion should be covered by foreign
contributions. Of the $15 billion appropriated for the
Persian Gulf Regional Defense Fund, only $320.5 million will
be required. These funds will support the Kiurdish relief
effort. As discussed throughout this thesis, there were
significant issues beyond determining the bottom line costs of
the war that impacted and influenced the cost estimating
19 This figure represents the $47.1 billion costs of DS/DS
plus the following: $2.1 billion from FY 1990 appropriation
for the war, $1.2 billion in costs of items not to be replaced
by DoD, $1.0 billion in costs to be absorbed by internal
realignment, $3.9 billion in present value of long-term
personnel benefits not affecting near-term funding
requirements, and $5.8 billion in in-kind assistance which
will not result in expenditures by the U.S.
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methodology. These issues include: defining incremental
costs, estimating incremental costs, and creating the account
structure to collect and monitor funding for the war.
A. DEFINING TFE APPROPRIATE COST MEASURE
At the onset of the crisis, costs were primarily developed
to determine the additional funding requirements created by
involvement in the crisis. Clearly, U.S. decisions on levels
of invol-'ement and policy are not based on these cost
estimates. However, our democratic process dictates
awareness.
As world opinion became clear and U.S. resolve was
maintained, these cost estimates began to serve another
purpose. World financial support for U.S. defense expenses
increased, requiring cost estimates to support requested
funding from other countries. As a result, these cost
estimates served dual purposes: to measure the additional
budget requirements for def. se and to measure the U.S.
contribution to the war effort.
These opposing requirements led to the debates over
incremental costs versus total incremental costs. [Ref. 12:pp.
4-5] For example, DoD total incremental costs include the
value of all equipment and munitions expended in DS/DS, even
resources U.D does not expect to replace. In contrast, the
incremental cost to support the DoD DS/DS funding requirements
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would exclude costs associated with the non-replaceable
equipment and munitions.
With the budget reduction legislation enacted at the
beginning of the crisis, the incremental cost of the war was
critical. As mandated in legislative language, only
incremental costs were to be included in emergent budgetary
requirements. These costs should reflect only those to be
absorbed by U.S. taxpayers. Defined narrowly, these would
include only costs of military operations not covered by
allied contributions and the cost of foreign assistance
resulting from the crisis. These emergent costs are exempted
from caps )n defense and international affairs spending
established in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. [Ref. 21:p.
3]
This was a significant challenge for DoD. The military
departments were not required to determine how much it cost to
conduct the operation. Rather, they were required to
determine how much the cost of the operation exceeded their
normal operating costs. This defined the concept of
marginalism. Therefore, the incremental cost estimates
provided by DoD to support budgetary requirements reflected
the marginal cost. While there were difficulties in
application, the concepts associated with marginalism applied.
Should marginal cost also support burden sharing
measurements of contribution? While it appears from this
discussion that marginal cost should be estimated to measure
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the U.S. contribution, burden sharing cost estimates should
reflect total incremental costs and not the budgetary
incremental cost. Thus, there are disparate underlying
principles for budgetary and burden sharing cost estimates.
While the appropriate incremental costs were collected for
DS/DS from a budgetary viewpoint, there are different costs
for different purposes. If the cost estimates were to be
developed to present the total incremental costs of the war,
then items such as debt relief and future previously unplanned
economic aid should also be included. However, there are
differing opinions on how much these items would actually add
to the cost of the war. For example, the cost of debt relief
to Egypt might be substantially less than the $7 billion
monetary value of the debt forgiveness, considering the
anticipated default status of that loan. However, even
without the inclusion of debt relief, U.S. postwar policies
could significantly add to the incremental cost of the war and
thus impact future budgets.
B. ABILITY OF DoD TO ESTIMATE COSTS
DS/DS provided a detailed examination of DoD's definition
of and ability to forecast incremental costs. The costs that
were eventually reported for funding requirements are
supported by the economic concept involved with marginalism.
While there were difficulties in estimating these costs, the
underlying concepts of marginalism were appropriately applied
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for funding requirements. Although the initial estimates may
have lacked clarity of definition, as time passed the cost
estimation methodology was refined and more accurately
reflected incremental costs. The concepts used to produce
these estimates will continue to be critical in defense
spending in light of future budget reductions.
In developing these cost estimates, the military
departments clearly had difficulty capturing these incremental
costs. Total costs involved in the operation were reported at
the unit level, but the offsetting cost reduction also
available at this level was often omitted. For example, total
unit costs should be reduced by the costs saved from exercises
canceled in other parts of the world. These cost savings were
recognized at higher levels, but only in aggregate terms. This
made it difficult to determine whether specific costs had been
properly charged to the operation at the unit level. This was
not unexpected in view of the accounting system in place for
the military departments. This system captures total
obligations, but is unable to capture incremental costs unless
the information is manually extracted. This shortcoming was
recognized from within DoD early in the conflict and is
continually reemphasized in GAO and CBO reports.
A separate topic associated with the cost estimates was
the initial tendency to compare estimated costs with the costs
of earlier conflicts. While these comparisons may have
provided some initial concept of how much a possible war could
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cost, more often inappropriate conclusions were drawn. The
Persian Gulf War indeed may have unexpectedly cost more than
Vietnam, on an average daily operating basis, but the
conflicts involved different strategies, tactics, and
equipment.
A more comparable type conflict appeared to be the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. In comparison, this war provides a fairly
reasonable estimate of the costs of war in this region. In
fact, while comparisons to Vietnam placed doubt on the cost
estimates prepared by DoD, comparison to the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War indicated the costs were reasonable. Any attempt to
determine reasonableness of costs should be based upon careful
analysis and recognition of limitations.
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF UNIQUE LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS
The war has also allowed the development and evaluation of
various funding mechanisms and unique funding structures,
which may or may not be useful in future conflicts. 1he first
was using the Feed and Forage Act to ensure the continued
operations of Armed Forces prior to the obtainment of
additional funding. Established during the Civil War, the Act
still provides flexibility for DoD forces to continue
operations while awaiting additional funding. Although there
were concerns in Congress concerning the Act, the strict
definition adhered to by DoD appears to have dispelled these
concerns.
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Another innovative legislative process during the war was
establishing an unique account structure for DS/DS and the
procedures to transfer funds between accounts. The initial
account established for foreign contributions was based on the
National Defense Conditional Gift Fund. While this account
provided for contributions for defense, the Treasury
department was responsible for ensuring funds were dispersed
according to the intent of the donor. The Defense Cooperation
Account replaced the National Defense Conditional Gift Fund
and authority over the account was transferred from the
Secretary of Treasury to SECDEF. However, the requirement for
Congress to appropriate funds from this account prior to DoD
use ensured normal control over the use of funds. While this
control may have seemed inflexible to SECDEF, it convinced
contributors of our ability to correctly manage funds for
DS/DS. This type of accounting structure may very well be
called upon again in future conflicts where allied countries
help offset U.S. costs.
The last item to discuss within the legislative process,
and perhaps the most subtle, was including the authorizing
committees in the review of supplemental funding requests.
Normally the supplemental requests would only be reviewed and
authorized by the appropriating committees. During DS/DS, the
supplemental requests were in fact reviewed by both
authorization and appropriation committees. This may have set
a precedent for future supplemental requests. Although not
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disruptive or time consuming in this instance, the
possibilities for both are very real in the future. In view
of this added review, it may very well be prudent to maintain
an emergency mechanism to overobligate funds, such as the Feed
and Forage Act, to ensure the ability to execute operations if
there are delays in the supplemental appropriation process.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
While lessons learned are being developed for military
tactics, weapons, and strategy based on the Persian Gulf war,
it is equally important to develop lessons learned on cost
estimate methodologies.
The first area to warrant further study is the efforts
associated with the valuation of in-kind assistance and the
lack of standardized reporting of this assistance. Clearly,
budgetary cost estimates require knowledge of offsetting
reductions available from in-kind assistance. However, it is
not critical, from a budgetary viewpoint, to have an accurate
valuation of what it cost the donating country to provide that
assistance. Rather, it is important to estimate the U.S. cost
avoidance as a result of receiving in-kind assistance. In
view of this, it would be worthwhile to conduct a joint review
involving OSD, GAO, and CBO, into the reporting format desired
for in-kind assistance. This is particularly important in
view of possible U.S. involvement in future regional conflicts
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outside of wealthy areas such as the Persian Gulf. In these
other areas, cash contributions may be more limited.
Another area warranting study is the monthly cost reports
produced by OMB/DoD. While these reports meet congressionally
mandated requirements for more accurate timely reporting, are
these ideal cost report formats? The specific categories for
reporting costs were stipulated by Congress. Are there more
practical formats that match Service accounting systems and
reduce the manual extraction of information? In view of the
requirement to continue these reports until November of 1992,
the opportunity exists to explore various formats and obtain
congressional support for these changes. Then a basic format
more consistent with DoD accounting systems would be available
if future events require similar reports.
The last area for further study is associated with recent
DoD initiatives to develop more cost conscious managers within
DoD. Specifically, the area of concern is the unit costing
initiative. There appears to be some misunderstanding of
whether unit costing could provide better incremental cost
estimates. Unit costing may in fact provide average cost
information, which will not automatically provide more
reliable incremental cost estimates. The misconception of
what unit costing will provide, and the specific application
to cost estimates developed during DS/DS, would make an ideal
follow-up study. These are but a few of the major areas that
warrant further research.
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APPENDIX A: SIGNIFICANT FUNDING EVENTS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
CHRONOLOGY - 1990
August 2 - President Bush announces new strategy
introducing the new world order at the Aspen Institute.
August 2 Iraqi Army invades Kuwait.
August 2 - President Bush issues Executive Orders
12722 and 12723, stopping all trade between Iraq and the United
States, freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and
banning Iraqi ships and planes from landing at U.S. ports.
August 2 - Congress passes H.R. 5431, banning all
trade with Iraq, stopping all foreign assistance to Iraq, and
opposing international financial institution loans to Iraq.
August 2 - Senate passes S.Res. 318, urging the
President to seek international cooperation in applying sanctions
against Iraq.
August 6 - Saudi Arabia requests United States
assistance and deployment of U.S. forces in country.
August 8 - President Bush announces the first
dispatch of military units to the Persian Gulf.
August 9 - Troops from the 82nd Airborne Division
arrive in Saudi Arabia.
August 11 - 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
departs U.S. for the Persian Gulf by fast sealift ship.
August 12 - United States begins a naval interdiction
program to enforce the trade embargo.
August 15 - Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) briefs
Fresident Bush on Desert Shield costs.
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August 21 - The Western European Union (WEU)1 elects
to coordinate its dispatch of naval forces to enforce the blockade
against Iraq but these forces will remain under their respective
national commands.
August 22 - President Bush signs Executive Order 12727
authorizing SECDEF and Department of Transportation (Coast Guard)
to order reserve units and individual reservists of the Selected
Reserve to active duty.
August 23 - SECDEF calls 48,800 reservists to active
duty under section 637b of Title 10, U.S.C. and Executive Order
12727. Authorized personnel call-up will be limited as follows:
USA-25,000, USN-6,300, USMC-3,000, USAF-14,500.
August 24 - SECDEF invokes 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11) Feed
and Forage Act of 1861 to obligate funds through the remainder of
FY 1990 for certain military needs in the Persian Gulf in advance
of appropriations.
August 24 - Comptroller notifies Congressional
leadership of SECDEF decision to invoke 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11),
as required by law.
August 24 - U.N. Security Council approves Resolution
655, authorizes the use of "such measures commensurate to the
specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward
and outward maritime shipping" to enforce the trade embargo against
Iraq.
August 25 - Army Reserve units activated.
August 29 - 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
arrives in Saudi Arabia.
September 6 - SECDEF transmits request for $1,888.5
million in FY 1990 supplemental appropriation to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and stipulates that incremental costs
for the operation in 1990 total $2,716 million; some of the costs
were offset by deferring and canceling lower priority requirements
per appropriation and transfer of funds.
September 6 - SECDEF invokes Section 2201 (c) of Title 10
authorizing the incurring of deficiencies for the costs of any
additional armed service members.
i. WEU is comprised of 9 European countries: United Kingdom,
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg,
and Portugal.
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September 7 - Military Reserve units deploy.
September 7 - Department of Defense (DoD) estimates the
incremental costs of Operation Desert Shield at $2.716 billion for
FY 1990 and $15 billion for FY 1991.
September 7 - Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimates the incremental costs of Desert Shield for 1990 to be
$2.2 billion and estimate the costs for FY 1991 at $7.56 billion.
September 10 - Comptroller notifies Congressional
leadership of SECDEF decision to invoke Section 2201 of Title 10.
September 11 - SECDEF testifies before the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) on Operation Desert Shield.
September 14 - President Bush transmits to Congress an FY
1990 Supplemental Appropriations request for Desert Shield which
included:
- request for the appropriation of $2 billion to cover the
additional costs of Desert Shield in FY 1990.
- authority to cancel Egypt's $6.7 billion military debt to
the U.S. in recognition of their support in the Iraq-Kuwait
crisis.
September 19 - SECDEF designates the Arabian Peninsula
for imminent danger pay.
September 19 - SECDEF testifies before the House
Appropriation Committee (HAC) on Operation Desert Shield.
September 19 - Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) offers amendment to the FY
1991 Defense Authorization Act to include recommendation of $1
billion for:
- correction of military pay anomalies.
- increased funds for programs useful in Desert Shield-type
contingencies of the future.
- congressional authorization of foreign funds contributed
to Desert Shield.
- a sense of Congress language that some combat reserves
should be mobilized.
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October 1 - H. J. Res 655, P.L. 101-403, the first
continuing resolution for FY 1991, is signed into law with the
following provisions:
- appropriation of $2,018,664,000 for Desert Shield
expenses in FY 1990.
- authority for DoD to transfer an additional. $75,037,000
from other DoD accounts into accounts used for Desert Shield.
- authority for SECDEF to accept contributions from foreign
nations or individuals to offset the costs of Desert Shield
and establishment of the Defense Cooperation Account (DCA) at
the Treasury into which these funds were to be deposited.
- stipulation that the funds from the DCA to DoD would
have to be authorized and appropriated by Congress.
- delay of the default deadline for Egypt's $6.7 billion
military debt to the U.S. until December 31, 1990.
October 1 - House passes H.J.Res. 658 supporting the
President's August 7 deployment of U.S. armed forces to defend
Saudi Arabia.
October 2 - Senate passes S.Con.Res. 147 that approved
the President's actions in the United Nations and calls for
international support of the sanctions against Iraq.
October 4 - SECDEF transmits FY 1991 Supplemental
Appropriations request to OMB.
October 22 - Comptroller transmits report on cash
contributions to defense oversight committees.
October 26 - H.R. 4739, P.L. 101-510, FY 1991 Defense
Authorization Act is passed by Congress with the following
provisions:
- authorized the funds that previously had been
appropriated in the first continuing resolution for FY 1991,
P.L. 101-403 ($2 billion for FY 90 and the transfer of $75
million within DoD accounts).
- authorized an additional $1 billion for Desert Shield
related expenses for FY 1991.
October 27 - H.R. 5114, P.L. 101-513, Foreign
Operations Appropriations is signed into law including section 586
which institutes economic sanctions against Iraq although sanctions
were already in place through Executive Orders 12722 and 12723
issued Aug 2.
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November 5 - H.R. 5803, P.L. 101-511, The Department of
Defense Appropriation Act, FY 1991, is signed into law with the
following provisions:
- appropriation of $1 billion from Defense Cooperation
Account to DoD, earlier authorized in H.R. 4739, October 26.
- amended section 637b of Title 10, U.S.C., allowing
Selected Reserves combat units ordered to active duty in
support of operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula and
Operation Desert Shield to be extended beyond the required
initial maximum period of 90 days service to 180 days and
likewise to extend the maximum period of any additional
service from 90 to 180 days for FY 1991.
November 5 - H.R. 5114, P.L. 101-513, Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, is signed into law with the
following provisions:
- requires the President to assemble a conference on the
Egypt debt situation, determine the real value of this debt
and report that to Congress, and if in the best interest of
national security to cancel the debt.
- provides Israel $700 million of excess military
equipment to be removed from Europe.
- added $100 million worth of equipment to the already
existing $100 million defense stockpile in Israel (to which
Israel has access in emergencies).
- disburses Israel's $1.8 billion in Foreign Military
Sales grants in the first month of the fiscal year, to invest
th- money in U.S. Treasury bonds, with the proceeds to go to
Israel.
November 5 - H.R. 5835, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OBRA) of 1990 is signed into law. Included in the Act are the
following provisions:
- Title 13 of OBRA was the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of
1990 which specifies the incremental costs of military
operations in the Middle East are exempt from the spending
limits on defense and that funds for these operations would be
provided through emergency appropriations and do not effect
spending caps.Also Egyptian military debt relief and
contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are
also exempt from spending caps.
- implements the five-year deficit reduction agreement.
November 8 - President Bush announces his intention to
increase the number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in the Persian
Gulf region from 200,000 to 400,000. This provides the allies the
option of offensive military action if needed.
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November 13 - CBO releases an updated cost estimate,
taking into account the planned additional personnel to be
deployed, and projects the incremental cost of Desert Shield to be
$12.1 billion for FY 1991.
November 13 - President issues Executive Order 12733
authorizing extension of active duty call-up personnel for selected
reserves from 90 to 180 days, pursuant to the FY 1991 Defense
Appropriation Act (P.L. 101-511).
November 14 - SECDEF, pursuant to 673b of Title 10,
U.S.C. and Executive Orders 12727 and 12733, increases reserve
call-up limits to USA-80,000, USN-10,000, USMC-15, 000, USAF-20,000.
November 29 - United Nations Security Council approves
Resolution 678 authorizing Member-states to use whatever means
necessary to force an Iraqi withdrawal after January 15, 1991.
December 1 - Comptroller transmits report on cash
contributions to Defense oversight committees.
December 1 - SECDEF, pursuant to 673b of Title 10,
U.S.C. and Executiv Orders 12727 and 12733, increases limits on
reserve call-ups: USA-115,000, USN-30,000, USMC-23,000, USAF-
20,000.
December 7 - Saddam Hussein releases all foreign
hostages.
December 21 - Comptroller notifies Congress of
intent to transfer $1 billion from the Defense Cooperation Account
as appropriated in P.L. 101-511.
December 27 - 300,000 U.S. personnel deployed to Persian
Gulf area (180,000 Army, 35,000 Air Force, 35,000 Navy, 50,000
Marines). The Joint Arab Islamic Force deployed to the area
totalled between 83,000-104,000, joining Saudi Arabia's 65,000
active military strength and 17,000 personnel from the Gulf
Cooperation Council countries.
December 31 - The DCA current balance stands at $4.3
billion with $15.9 million interest income generated. $1 billion
had been withdrawn for DoD since establishment of the account.
Total cash received from foreign contributions in the DCA was




January 3 - Pentagon announces 325,000 U.S. military
personnel have been deployed to Gulf area for Operation Desert
Shield.
January 9 - U. S. Secretary of State Baker meets with
Iraqi Foreign Minister.
January 12 - Congress approves H.Con.Res. 32,
reaffirming that Congress had the Constitutional authority to
declare war and that offensive action against Iraq must be approved
by Congress.
January 12 - House of Representatives approves H.J.Res.
77 authorizing the President to use military force providing the
President certifies to Congress that diplomatic efforts to resolve
the crisis have failed. Also, the Senate passes S.J.Res. 2
aiuthorizing the use of force providing the President certifies
diplomacy has failed to resolve the crisis. Since H.J.Res. 77 was
similar, the Senate agreed to substitute H.J.Res 77 for S.J.Res. 2
and forwarded it to the White House for signature.
January 14 - President Bush signs P.L. 102-1
authorizing the use of armed force to expel Iraq from Kuwait
per conditions specified in H.J.Res 77.
January 15 Deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait
passes.
January 16 - President Bush submits to Congress a
written certification, as called for in P.L. 102-1, that peaceful
and diplomatic means has failed to resolve the crisis.
January 16 - 7 p.m. EST, the Air phase of Operation
Desert Storm begins.
January 17 - Senate passes S.Con.Res. 2, which
commended President Bush for his actions as Commander-in-Chief and
states Congress' support for the men and women of the U.S. Armed
Forces. The House concurred with and passed this resolution on
January 18.
January 21 - President Bush issues Executive Order
designating Arabian Peninsula a combat zone.
February 1 - Total U.S. deployment to Persian Gulf
Region reaches 430,000.
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February 4 - President releases FY 1992/FY 1993 budget
request containing a $3O billion "place holder" for FY 1991 costs
of Operation Desert Shield.
February 6 - Secretary Atwood designates Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Syria and Turkey for imminent danger pay.
February 12 - SECDEF invokes 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11, Feed
and Forage Act) and Section 2201(c) of Title 10, which is the
intent to obligate funds through the remainder of FY 1991 for
certain military needs in advance of appropriations and authorizing
the incurring of deficiencies for the costs of any such additional
armed service members respectively.
February 12 - SECDEF forwards the first FY 1991
Supplemental request to OMB.
February 13 - Comptroller notifies congressional
leadership of SECDEF decision to invoke 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11) and
2201(c) of Title 10.
February 22 - President transmits to the Congress the
first FY 1991 Supplemental Appropriation request for Desert
Storm/Desert Shield costs. Included in the proposal are the
following:
- request for $42.6 billion for DS costs for FY 1991.
- request for $15 billion in budget authority to establish
and fund a new account called the Desert Shield Working
Capital Account. The funds in this account would be available
for transfer to SECDEF, with the approval of OMB, in order to
maintain continuity of payment for the incremental costs of
war. If funds were required from this account, the incoming
funds into the DCA would replenish the funds withdrawn. An
initial $15 billion in U.S. funds is recommended to be placed
in this account.
- request for SECDEF authority, with OMB concurrence,
to transfer funds from the DCA account to reimburse defense
appropriation accounts depleted by the incremental costs of
the war.
- request that Congress formally appropriate for DoD the
amount contributed to the DCA, with no specific amount of
money indicated.
February 23 Ground phase of Operation Desert Storm
begins.
February 28 - Ground operations halt.
February 28 - DoD provides an updated estimate for the
FY 1991 incremental costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm at $39.2
billion.
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April 3 - United Nations Security Council approves
Resolution 687 and includes the following provisions:
- Iraq to recognize the Iraqi-Kuwait border agreement
of 1963.
- U.N. to establish peace observer group to ensure the
border is maintained between Kuwait and Iraq.
- Iraq and U.N. to destroy Iraqi's chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons facilities and its ballistic missiles.
April 6 - S. 725, P.L. 102-25, Persian Gulf Conflict
Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, is
signed into law with the following provisions:
- requirement that the administration submit more detailed,
monthly reports on incremental expenses actually incurred by
DoD for DS/DS and the amount of foreign contributions made to
the U.S. in support of DS/DS.
- personnel benefits packages including the increased
imminent danger pay and monthly separation pay.
- requirement that DoD withhold from non-paying pledging
nations payments that would otherwise be made as
reimbursements for indirect-hire foreign nationals working at
U.S. installations abroad, though SECDEF may waive this
provision.
- requirement for an interim report on the conduct of
the Persian Gulf Conflict be submitted to Congress by July 1,
1991, and a final report by January 15, 1992.
April 10 - H.R. 1282, P.L. 102-28, Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1991, is
signed into law with the following provisions:
- establishment of a new account (Persian Gulf Regional
Defense Fund) in which $15 billion of U.S. funds were
appropriated to serve as a "bridge gap" loan if foreign
contributions in the DCA were unable to meet appropriated DoD
requirements. DoD may draw on this account only to the extent
that funds are not available in the DCA.
- appropriation of $42,625,822,000 for Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm FY 1991.
- prohibition of new arms sales to those nations not
fulfilling commitments made to the U.S. during the Persian
Gulf crisis.
- authority for SECDEF to draw funds from DCA once they have
been authorized and appropriated. SECDEF must inform Congress
at least seven days prior to executing transfer of funds.
April 10 - Comptroller notifies congressional
leadership of intent to transfer $28.1 billion from Defense
Cooperation Account and $3.7 billion from Persian Gulf Regional
Defense Fund to DoD accounts to meet previously appropriated
requirements of $42.6 billion specified in the first supplemental
bill.
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April 10 - H.R. 1281, P.L. 102-27, Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations is signed into law with the following
provisions:
- $655 million in expanded personnel and veterans benefits
considered to represent incremental costs of DS/DS to be
funded from the DCA.
- $650 million in emergency aid to Israel and $200 million
in emergency aid to Turkey.
April 20 - OMB provides the first monthly cost report
to Congress as required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25.
April 25 - President Bush submits supplemental
request to aid refugees from DS/DS.
May 6 - Comptroller notifies Congress of the
transfer of $27.1 billion from Defense Cooperation Account to DoD
accounts.
June 13 - H.R. 2251, P.L. 102-55, The Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations From Contributions of Foreign
Governments and/or Interest for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees
and Displaced Persons In and Around Iraq as a Result of the Recent
Invasion of Kuwait and for Peacekeeping Activities and Other Urgent
Needs Act of 1991, is signed into law with the following
provisions:
- making dire emergency supplemental appropriations from
contributions of foreign governments in the Persian Gulf
Regional Defense Fund and/or from interest in the DCA.
- funds are for humanitarian assistance to refugees and
displaced persons in and around Iraq as a result of the recent
invasion of Kuwait and for peacekeeping activities, and for
other urgent needs for FY 1991.
July 9 - President transmits to Congress the second
FY 1991 Supplemental Defense Appropriation request for Desert
Storm/Desert Shield. Included in the proposal are the following:
- request for an additional $2.949 billion for incremental
costs of operation for FY 1991.
- request to transfer $6.573 billion of the initial $42.6
billion, appropriated in P.L. 102-28, the Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1991, to
FY 1992 accounts for which funding was originally provided.
This transfer of funds was primarily due to under funding of
personnel and operations and maintenance accounts.
- updated estimate of possible total incremental cost
of operation at $61.1 billion.
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APPENDIX. METHODS USED To -STIMATE
ADDED COSTS OF A WAR
The Congressional Budget Office based its assessment of the added costs of
a war on forecasts by various experts of the characteristics of a war. This
appendix discusses these forecasts and the methods used to translate wartime
characteristics into costs.
FORECASTS OF THE CHAEACTERISTICS OF A WAR
The estimates of wartime characteristics shown in Table A-1 reflect the
forecasts made by military analysts working independently and at research
institutions and universities, as well as forecasts contained in press reports
purporting to represent Pentagon estimates. These forecasts are based on
widely differing assumptions about the nature of a Persian Gulf war. All of
the estimates assume that the United States would have to attack on the
ground as well as in the air, but they differed about the duration of the
ground attacks (from brief to protracted) and on their scope. 1 Most analysts
assumed that ground attacks would be confined to Kuwait and nearby portions
of Iraq. The analysts at the Center for Defense Information, however,
assumed that the allies would wage a land campaign against Baghdad.
TRANSLATING CHARACTERISTICS INTO COSTS
CBO estimated all costs in 1991 dollars of budget authority using various
estimating methods, depending on the category of costs. The details for each
category are shown in Table A-2.
Military personnel costs were estimated based on numbers of personnel
and average costs per person. Estimates assumed that some of the personnel
reductions in the actiye-duty foice-planned for 1991 would be postponed. The
lower estimate assumed postponement of half the reduction, whica rc .uired
funding for about 20,000 additional man-years in 1991; the higher estimate
assumed postponement of all of the reductions, requiring funding for 40,000
additional man-years in 1991. The lower estimate assumed a buildup to about
150,000 reserves by the middle of fiscal year 1991, followed by a reduction to
i. Trevor Dupuy argued that the allies could perhaps prevail against Iraq relying
only on an air attack. The assumption of an air-only war was, however, in only
one of twelve scenarios for war considered by Dupuy. None of the other
military analysts assumed an air-only war. Therefore, all of CBO's estimates
assume some ground combat.
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TABLE A-1. PUBLIC ESTIMATES OF CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR-
GROUND WAR
Tactical Hell-
Casualties Tanks Aircraft copters
Source Length (Thousands) Lost Lost Lost
Epstein Weeks 3 to 16 200 to 900 300 to 600 75 to 250
of combat
Posen b Weeks 4 to 11 n.a. n.AL n.a.




Projections d Months 10 to 30 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Press
Reports n.a. Up to 16 200 100 to 300 n.a.
Center for Defense
Information f  Months 40 to 45 n.a. n.a. n.a.
SOURCE: Conressional Budget Office based on forecasts cited in notes a through f.
NOTE: All figures apply to U.S. forces on, na.-not avalable.
a. Information from Joshua M. Epstein. Brookinp Institution, "War with Iraq: What Price Victoryr
Briefing to the Office or the Joint Chiefs or Stall, Washington, D.C, December 19,1990. Epstein
nu revise his numbers somewhat in the future. CBO estimated equipment losses by assming
that 75 percent of the total atrition derived by Epstein's calulladtion would reUm in the
permanent loss of equipment. ThU other atition, not reflected in the above aumbes would
result from wear and tear during wartime that would render some equipmet usumble for the
duration or hostilities and that would require emtensive repair-but no new promremet-after
hostilities were completed.
b. Barry R. Posen, Political Objectives and Military Optiom in the Penian Gulf.' Defese and Arms
Control Studies Workin Paper, Massachusetts ntitute of Teclnology, Cabridge, Masu.
(November 1990), pp. 24-2S.
C. Trevor N. Dupay, Colox4 U.S. Army, Retired, Attrition: Foremsrin Battle Camalties and
Eauioment Losses in Modem War (Faidui, Va.: Nero Books Decmber 1990). pp. 94-103, 12.
132; and I War Comes. Hew to Defeat Saddam Hussein (Fairfo, VA.: Hero looks, 1991), page
proofs, p. 104. CBO estimated tank and heliopter loes by extrapolating from Dupus historical
data. In the latter book. and in Conpresionad tetimony, Dupuy also cmusiders the posibity of
an air cmpaign that produces vietory for the malition with fewer than 1,0 US. camaltim. In
keeping with its focus on air-round scenarios, however, CDO did not investigate this ca further.
d. Rick Atknson and George C. Wilson "nd War. Centerpiece of Struep.' Washio s
December 8, 1990, p. Al; Patrick E. Tyler, 'Iraq's Aim: Hgh ToU for G1.'s,' New York Tynes
November 27,1990, p. 16; Bruce W. Nelan. Ready for Action." Ii November 12 1990, p. 26.
e. George J. Church, 'If War Begins,* "iML December 10, 1990, p. 28 .
f. Center for Defense Information, 'U.S. invasion of Iraq: Appraising the Options,' The.Dh
MomjL vol. 19. no. a (WashingtOn. D.C., 1990).
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TABLE A-2. DETAILS OF CBO ESTIMATES OF COSTS OF WAR
(Costs in billions of constant 1991 dollars of budget authority)
Total
Case Assumptions Added Cost
Added Military Personnel Costs
Lower Build to 150,000 Reserves, Reduce to 30,000 by End of
Fiscal Year 1991 3.1
Postpone Half of 1991 Personnel Cuts (40,000 People) 1.4
400,000 Receive Hostile Fire Pay for 3/4 Fiscal Year,
$110/Month 0.4
Total 4.9
Higher Build to 150,000 Reserves and Hold That Level Throughout
Fiscal Year 1991 4.8
Postpone All 1991 Personnel Cuts (80,000 People) 2.8
400,000 Receive Hostile Fire Pay for Entire Fiscal Year U
Total 8.1
Added Operation and Maintenance Costs
Lower Weeks of Intensive Combat, 3,000 U.S. Casualties 1.0
Higher Months of Variable Combat, 45,000 U.S. Casualties 15.0
Replacement Costs of Major Weapons
Lower 100 Tactical Aircraft at $25 Million Each (F-15/F-16 Mix) 2.5
Two-thirds of a Division (200 Tanks) at $3.0 Billion per
Division (Heavy MI Division) 2 .
Total 4.5
Higher 600 Aircraft at $25 Million Each 15.0
3 Divisions (900 Tanks) at $3.0 Billion Each 9.0
5 Ships at $0.75 Billion Each
Total 27.8
Replacement Costs of Missiles and Ammunition
Lower Aircraft Attack Ground Targets for 15 Days at 1 Sortie/Day,
Using 15,000 Missiles at $100,000 Each 15
Army and Marine Corps Ground Forces Fight for 15 Days
at Half the Intensity Assumed for Europe 3.0
Air Force and Navy Aircraft Use 2 Missiles per Iraqi
Aircraft, Against 200 Aircraft 0.1





Replacement Costs of Missiles and Ammunition (Continued)
Higher Aircraft Attack at Variable Rates Over Long Period,
Using 30,000 Missiles 3.0
Army and Marine Corps Fight at Full Intensity for 30 Days,
or Lower Intensity Over Longer Period 12.0
Air Force and Navy Use 5 Missiles per Iraqi Aircraf,
Against 500 Aircraft 0.8
Navy Shoots at 375 Targets, 4 Munitions Each 12
Total 17.0
Added Costs of Medical Care
Lower 3,000 Casualties (600 Killed, 2,400 Wounded),
for Immediate Care 0.1
3,000 Casualties, for Care and Compensation Beyond
Fiscal Year 1991
Total 0.2
Higher 45,000 Casualties (7,800 Killed, 37,200 Wounded),
for Immediate Care 2.2
45,000 Casualties, for Care and Compensation Beyond
Fiscal Year 1991 1.
Total 3.8
Basic Support Costs
Lower Costs of Negotiated Settlement (Less Personnel Costs
Included Elsewhere) 12.0
Higher Lower Estimate Plus Net Cost of Maintaining 400,000
Troops Throughout 1991 14.0
SOURCE: Conipsomal Budget Ofrne.
NOTE: Details may not add to totals bemuse of roundin&.
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about 30,000 reserves by year's end. The higher estimate assumed the same
buildup but no reduction. The estimates assumed that 400,000 U.S. military
personnel would draw hostile fire pay either for three-quarters of the fiscal
year (lower estimate) or for the entire fiscal year (higher estimate).
Several methods were used in estimating wartime operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs. The primary method was based on the U.S.
experience in Vietnam. CBO used DoD estimates of the added O&M costs
during the Vietnam War, adjusted to 1991 dollars but reduced to eliminate
the added O&M costs associated with the larger number of personnel serving
in the military during the Vietnam War. 2 The resulting figure was divided
by the number of casualties during the Vietnam War, which provided an
adjustment for the duration and intensity of the conflict. The ratio of cost to
casualties was adjusted upward in real terms by 3 percent a year through fiscal
year 1991 to reflect higher operating costs associated with today's more
complex equipment. (The 3 percent figure is based on the approximate
growth in O&M per active-duty person experienced between the 1960s and
1990.) The resulting annual factors were !zveraged for each year of the
Vietnam War. The resulting average factor of about $350,000 for each
casualty was used in estimating O&M costs under this method.
The results using this method are broadly consistent with estimates using
other approaches. For example, estimates seem roughly consistent with costs
incurred during the Korean War. Indeed, although available data regarding
costs of the Korean War are more limited than data for Vietnam, they suggest
that the cost per casualty may have been somewhat higher during the Korean
War-perhaps one-quarter to one-half higher-than costs experienced during
the Vietnam War. Another method for estimating added wartime operating
costs-the use of models that estimate the costs associated with increases in
the tempo of operations that would occur during a war-was also employed as
a check. CBO had detailed models available only for the Air Force and had
to extrapolate to estimate costs for ground forces. Using this method, CBO
estimated that doubling or even tripling the normal peacetime tempo of
operations in theater would yield added operations cost ranging between $1
2. In estimating the added costs of the Vietnam war, DoD apparently included the
extra O&M espenses for all personnel added tD the military after 1964. Thus,
some of the added O&M costs for Vietnam resulted not from the higher
intensity of combat operations, but from the costs of having more personnel
employed in the military. Because the United States apparently would fight a
Persian Gulf war without adding new military personnel, CBO subtracted the
added Vietnam O&M costs associated with a larger military before using the
numbers to assess the costs of a Persian Gulf war.
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billion and $3 billion for each month of intensive combat. These results seem
broadly consistent with the results obtained using data from the Vietnam War.
Costs to replace equipment were derived from military analysts' estimates
of equipment losses. Tank losses were translated into armored division-
equivalents by dividing by about 300 tanks. For each division-equivalent that
was lost, CBO assumed replacement costs of $3 billion. This figure is
intended to capture the costs of replacing not only tanks but also helicopters
and associated equipment that might be lost during ground combat (but not
the costs of munitions and spare parts, which are included in other cost
categories). Each fixed-wing tactical aircraft that was lost was assumed to cost
$25 million-roughly the cost of replacement with the mix of today's versions
of the A-10, F-16, F-15, F/A-18, and other aircraft that are in the Persian
GulL For the higher cost estimate only, CBO assumed the loss of five ships,
each costing an average of $750 million to replace. Although none of the
military analysts addressed ship losses, such losses seem possible, particularly
if the war featured a major amphibious assault.
Replacement costs for munitions (missiles and ammunition) could not be
estimated directly from the experts' forecasts because none of them explicitly
addressed munitions use. CBO's estimate assumed heavy use of munitions,
consistent with the assumption that a Persian Gulf war would be intense. For
ground weapons, CRO assumed munitions were either consumed for 15 days
at half the daily rate of usage for a major European war (in the lower cost
estimate) or for the equivalent of 30 to 60 days at daily usage rates equal to
between half the European rate and the ull European rate (in the higher
estimate). Air-to-ground usage was assumed to be equivalent to 15,000
missiles at the average cost of a Maverick missile (in the lower estimate) or
30,000 such missiles (in the higher estimate). Attacking aircraft were assumed
to use 400 air-to-air missiles-assumed to cost about $0.3 million each-in the
lower estimate (based on 2 missiles for each of 200 Iraqi aircraft) and 2,500
such missiles in the higher estimate (based on 5 missiles for each of 500 Iraqi
aircraft). Finally, the Navy was assumed to shoot between 500 ship-to-surface
missiles (lower estimate) and 1,500 such missiles (higher estimate).
Added costs of medical care would include costs for long-term treatment
of casualties in U.S. hospitals, costs for the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) brought about by heavy use
of military hospitals by injured military personnel, and costs of disability
retirement (which would affect the budget of the Department of Veterans
Affairs). Cost estimates for medical care were based on peacetime experience
as weU as experience in the Vietnam and Korean wars.
123
Finally, basic support costs include operation and maintenance costs for
U.S. troops in the absence of hostilities (these costs are included because the
method used to estimate wartime operating costs measures only the added
costs of maintaining a wartime tempo) as well as costs that would be incurred
before and after a war. For the lower estimate, these basic support costs are
assumed to equal the costs of a negotiated settlement less reserve costs that
were included in a preceding cost category. Thus, basic support costs in the
lower estimate include costs to move an additional 200,000 trOops to the
Persian Gulf and to move some troops home. The higher estimate of basic
support costs also includes funds to move troops home (though these costs
would probably be incurred in years beyond 1991) plus operation and
maintenance costs to maintain all 400,000 troops in the Persian Gulf
throughout 1991.
Estimating 1991 Budget Authority
Assumptions about what portion of total added costs would result in increased
1991 budget authority vary by cost category. For some categories, the
allocation to 1991 or the years beyond seems clear. Most added costs for
military personnel, and for basic support, are assumed to result in increases
in 1991 budget authority. All costs of disability retirement are also assumed
to be incurred beyond 1991.
For other cost categories, CBO made assumptions that seem reasonable
but, as the text notes, are uncertain. Roughly three-quarters of the total costs
for operation and maintenance and for medical care (excluding costs of
disability retirement) are assumed to be authorized in 1991. If, as is assumed,
the war started in early 1991, DoD would probably place orders for
replacement supplies reasonably quickly. But only one-quarter of the costs
for replacement of munitions are assumed to be authorized in 1991 because
of the time that would probably be required to assess inventories and mike
decisions about how many munitions are to be bought .None of the extra
budget azhoitylfor-weapons.is-assumedto.hbe.inrred in 1991 -ecfttt. ,ime
wilU probably be needed to n4kcde sis.n. about what weapons (if any) to
replace.
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APPENDIX C: FEED AND FORAGE ACT
Section 3732 is a limited stop-gap measure which authorizes
the military component to incur new obligations for specific
purposes in excess of appropriations available. It is the policy
of the Department to limit the use of this authority to emergency
circumstances; when immediate action is imperative and such action
cannot be delayed long enough to obtain supplemental funds. It
enables incurring obligations on a deficiency basis for clothing,
subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters and medical and hospital
supplies. Specific application to the Military Personnel and
Operation and Maintenance appropriations follow:
Military Personnel Appropriations - Includes clothing and clothing
allowance, subsistence, and PCS. Excludes basic pay, incentive
pay, special pay, pro pay, reenlistment bonus, station allowance
overseas, separation payments, family separation allowance, BAQ,
BAS for officers, and uniform allowance for officers.
Operation and Maintenance Appropriations. - Fuel: Includes
gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, coal, fuel oil, gas or other fuels
used in vehicles, boats, aircraft, for stationary engines, or for
production of utilities.
Medical and Hospital Supplies: Includes drugs, medicines, medical
instruments, protective clothing, liens, medical equipment,
hospital beds and other hospital supplies.
Transportation: Includes movement of persons or property by
commercial or government facilities; maintenance and repair of
vehicles, aircraft and boats of all types; operation of ports,
terminal facilities, motor pools.
Clothing: Includes organization clothing and equipment worn by the
individual.
SOURCE: Hearing before the Committee on the Budget, House of
Representatives, "Defense Budget Overview for Fiscal Year 1992,",
February 21, 1991.
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF OMB MONTHLY COST REPORT
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
NtWAS1INGTON, D.C. 20503
THE DIRECTOR September 16, 1991
lonorab]e J. Danforth Quayle
Pre!;ident of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr-. President:
Enclosed is the eventh report on United States Costs in the
Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions to Offset Such
Costs, as required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25. This report
was prepared in consultation with the Sccretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other
appropriate government officials. Previous reports have covered
the costs and contributions for the period beginning August 1,
1990, and ending on June 30, 1991, for costs, and July 31, 1991,
for contributions.
In accord with the legal requirement, this report provides
the following information:
o the incremental costs associated with Operation Desert
Storm that were incurred during July 3991;
o the cumulative total of such costs, by fiscal year, from
August 1, 1990, to July 31, 1991;
o the costs that are nonrecurring costs, offset by in-kind
contributions, or offset by the realig:ment,
rcprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for
activities unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict;
o the allocation of costs among the military departments,
the Defense Agencies of the Department of Defense, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense by category --
airlift, soalift, personnel, personnel support, operating
support, fuel, procurement, and military construction;
and
o the amount of contributions made to the United States by
each foreign country during August 1991, as well as the
cumulative total of such contributions. The report
specifies the amount of cash payments pledged and
received, provides a description and value of in-kind
contributions pledged and received, and identifies
restrictions on the use of such contributions.
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The costs reported to this point should be viewed as partial
and preliminary for reasons noted in the enclosure. As required
by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25, an eighth report will be submitted
by October 15th. In accord with the legal requirement, it will
cover incremental costs associated with Operation Desert Storm
that were incurred in August 1991, and foreign contributions for
September 1991. Subsequent reports will be submitted by tho 15th
day of each month, as reqiired, and will revise preliminary
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UNITED STATES COSTS IN THE PERSTAN GULF CONFI.TCT AND
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFSET SUCH COSTS
Report #7: September 15, 1991
Section 401 of P.L. 102-25 requires a series of reports on
incremental costs associated with Operation Desert Storm and on
foreign contributions to offset such costs, Th1is is the seventh
of such reports. As required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25, it
covers costs incurred during July 1991 and contributions made
during August 1991. Previous reports have covered the costs and
contributions for the period beginning August 1, 1990, and ending
on June 30, 1991, for costs, and July 31, 1991, for
contributionis.
Costs
The costs covered in this and subsequent reports are full
incremental costs of Operation Desert Storm. These are
additional costs resulting directly from the Persian Gulf crisis
(i.e., costs that would not otherwise have been incurred). It
should be noted that only a portion of full incremental costs are
included in Defense supplemental appropriations. These portions
are costs that require financing in fiscal year 1991 or fiscal
year 1992 and that are exempt from statutory Defense budget
ceilings. Not included in fiscal year 1991 or fiscal year 1992
appropriations are items of full incremental costs such as
August-September 1990 costs and costs covered bY in-kind
contributions from allies.
Table 1 summarizes preliminary estimates of Department of
Defense full incremental costs associated with Operation Desert
Storm from August 1, 1990, through July 31, 1991. The cost
information is shown by the cost and financing categories
specified in Section 401 of P.L. 102-25. Tables 2-9 provide more
detailed information by cost category. Costs shown in this
report were developed by the Department of Defense and are based
on the most recent data available.
Througlh July 1991, costs of $45.3 billion were reported by
the Department of Defense. The costs reported so far are
preliminary. This report includes an estimate of costs
identified to date of equipment repair, rehabilitation, and
maintenance caused by the high operating rates and combat use.
The report also includes some of the costs of phasodown of
operations and the return home of the deployed forces.
While a substantial portion of the costs have been reported,
incremer.tal costs are being and wi]l continue to be incurred in
stabsequent months. These include equipment repair,
rehabilitation, and restoration that have not so far been
identified, long-term benefit and disability costs, and the cotsts
of continuing operations in the region. About 42,000 military
personnel were in the region at th~e end of July, and
approximately 28,000 reservistfi were still on active duty at that
time. significant progress hds been made in returning equipment
from Southwest Asia; however, considerable amounts of materiel,
equipment, ammunition and vehicles still had not been shipped
from the area at the end of July. Materiel still in theater
includes some large, heavy pieces of equipment which are costly
and time consuming to prepare and transport. Combat aircraft
continue to fly in the region and the U.S. forces will continue
to remain in the region until all parties are satisfied with long
term security arrangements. The costs through July plus the
other costs not yet reported are expected by the Department of
Defense to result in total incremental costs of over $61 billion.
Incremental Coast Guard costs of $6 million were incurred
during this reporting period, with cumulative costs of $34
million through July to support military operations in the
Persian Gulf.
.pj tribut ions
Section 401 of P.L. 102-25 requires that this report include
the amount of each country's contribution during the period
covered by the report, as well as the cumulative total of such
contributions. Cash and in-kind contributions pledged and
received are to be specified.
Tables 10 and 11 list foreign contributions pledged in 1990
and 1991, respectively, and amounts received in August. Cash and
in-kind contributions are separately specified.
As of September 11, 1991, foreign countries contributed
$8.0 billion of the $9.7 billion pledged in calendar year 1990,
and $39.9 billion of the $44.2 billion pledged in calendar year
1991. Of the total $48.0 billion received, $42.5 billion was in
cash and $5.5 billion was in-kind assistance (including food,
fuel, water, building materials, transportation, and support
equipment). Table 12 provides further-details on in-kind
contributions.
Table 13 summarizes the current status of commitments and
contributions received through September 12, 1991.
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Future IReports
As required by Section 401 of P.L. 102-25, the next report
will be submitted by October 15th. In accord with the legal
requirement, it will cover incremental costs associated with
Operation Desert Storm that were incurred in August 1991, and
foreign contributions for September 1991. Subsequent reports
will be submitted by the 15th day of each month, as required, and
will revise preliminary reports to reflect additional costs as
they are estimated or re-estimated.
List of Tables
Table I - Summary, Incremental Costs Associated with Operation
Desert Storm
Table 2 - Airlift, Incremental Costs Associated with Operation
Desert Storm
Table 3 - Scalift, Incremental Costs Associated with Operation
Desert Storm
Table 4 - Personnel, Incremental Costs Associated with Operation
Desert Storm
Table 5 - Personnel Support, Incremental Costs Associated with
Operation Desert Storm
Table 6 - Operating Support, Incremental Costs Associated with
Operation Desert Storm
Table 7 - Fuel, Incremental Costs Associated with Operation
Desert Storm
Table 8 - Procurement, Incremental Costs Associated with
Operation Desert Storm
Table 9 - Military Construction, Incremental Costs Associated
with Operation Desert Storm
Table 10 - Foreign Contributions Pledged in 1990 to Offset U.S.
Costs
Table 11 - Foreign Contributions Pledged in 1991 to Offset U.S.
Costs
Table 12 - Description of In-kind Assistance Received to Offset
U.S. Costs as of August 31, 1991
Table 13 - Foreign Contributions Pledged in 1990 and 1991 to





INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incuired by the Department of DefCnsO
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY 1990 FY 1991 Paltial and
Pieliminaty
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Sep Oct - June July through July July 1991
(1) Airlift 412 2,303 38 2,341 2,753
(2) Sealift 235 3.474 39 3.513 3,748
(3) Personnel 223 4,946 228 5,174 6,397
(4) Personnel Support 352 5,340 228 5,569 5,920
(5) Operating Support 1,210 12,268 670 12,938 14,148
(6) Fuel 626 3,715 217 3,932 4,558
(7) Procurement 129 8,275 43 8,318 8,447
(8) Military Construction 11 355 355 366
Total 3,197 40,676 1,463 42,139 45,33L 2i
Nonrecurring costs
included above 3/ 201 12,912 57 12,969 13,171
Costs offset by:
In-kind coniibutions 225 5,113 116 5,229 6,454
Acaligonm_.nt 41 91;3 116 116 1.029
1/ Data was compiled by OMB. Source of data -- Oepartment of Defense. This report adjusts earlier
estimates to reflect more complete accounting Information.
2/ The costs reported so far are preliminary. This report Includes an estimate of costs Identified to date
of equipment repair. rehabilitation, and maintenance caused by the high operating rates and combat
use. Addilional costs for these caelogories will be report d as more Informalion becomes available.
The report also includes some of the costs of phasedown of operations and the return home of the
deployed forces, However, certain long-term benefit and disability costs have not been reflected in
the estimates. Those costs will be reportud in later repotns. The costs through July plus tho otlhcr
costs not yet reported are expected by the Depaitment of Defense to result in total Incremental costs
of slightly more than $61 billion.
3/ Nonrecurring costs include Investment costs associated with procurement and Military Construction,
as wcll as oth, r one-time costs Such as the activation of the Ready Reserve Force ships.
4 This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict. 132
Tabla 2
Al R L IF'_T
INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Dopanmentl of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Thfough July 31. 1991
(S in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
fY 1990 FY 199, Partial and
Pieliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -Aug - Sep Oct - June July throughJuly July 1991
Airlif_ t
Ar my 207 1,062 1,062 1,268
Navy 85 709 12 721 806
Air Force 114 504 26 530 645
Intelligence Agencies 1 1 1
Special Operations Command 6 28 33
Total 412 2,303 38 2,341 2.753
Nonrecurring costs Included above 986 986 986
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 7 92 2 94 101
Realignment 1/ 6 .... 6
11 This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict,
This category includes costs related to the transportation by air of personnel, equipment and
supplies.
The previous October-June estimate has been reduced by $58 million due to a recatogorlzation of
certain costs to operating support.
During this period over 500 redeployment missions were flown, returning over 12,000 people and




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31. 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
EXA99Q EY1991 Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Sep Oct - June July thloughl July July 1991
Army 123 2,793 6 2,799 2.922
Navy 99 410 7 417 516
Air Force 12 256 25 281 293
Defense Logistics Agency 14 14 14
Special Operations Command 2 2 2 4
Total _ 235 3.474 39 3,513 3,748
Nonrecurring Costs included above 67 1,100 2 1,102 1,159
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 2 138 4 142 144
Reali nment it 2 1 2
1/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This categorf Includes costs related to the transportation by sea of personnel, equipment and
supplics.
During this period a total of 57 ships (22 of tlhem foreign flag ships) madc redeployment




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by tile Department of Dolense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
FY 1990 EY 1991. Partial and
Preliminary
This peiod Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Sep Oct - Juno July_- throu0h July July 1991
.Personnel
Army 126 2,993 115 3,108 3.233
Navy 22 1,082 54 1.136 1,158
Air Force 75 871 59 930 1,005
Total 223 I  4.946 228 5,174 5.397




11 This Includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes pay and allowances of members of the reserve components of the Armed
Forces called or ordered to active duty and the increased pay and allowances of members of the regular
components of the Armed Forces Incurred because of deployment In connection with Operation Desert
Storm.
The previous October-June estimate has been reduced by $102 million due to a recalculation of Air
Force reserve costs.





INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Dopartment of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
(S in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
-F1 9 0 FY 1991 Partial and
Preliminal y
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Scp Oct- June July through July July 1991
Personnel Supporl
Army 209 4.055 33 4,088 4,297
Navy 104 849 59 908 1,013
Air Force 24 389 134 523 646
Intolligenco Agencies 2 9 0 11 10 12
Defense Logistics Agency 12 16 1 16 28
Dofonse Mapping Agency 5 1 6 6
Special Operations Command 2 8 0 1/ 8 9
Office of t11e Secretary of Defense 9 1 10 10
Total 352 5,340 228 5,569 5,920
Nonrecurring Costs included above 4 1,230 12 1,242 1,246
Costs offset by:
In-kind conitibutiols 28 1,615 19 1,634 1,661
R ealignm ent 2/ - 3 . ...- 3
1/ Costs are less than $500 thousand.
2/ This includes the realignment. reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropiated for activities
unrelated to the Porsian Gulf conflict.
This category includes subsistence, uniforms and medical costs.




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPEnATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1. 1990 Through July 31. 1991
($ in millions)
Preli iinary Estimates
FY 1990 FY 1991 Partial and
Preliminai y
This period Total Aug 1990 -
_Auq -Sep Oct - June July througll July July 1991
Qpaitlng $uppoIj
Army 896 6.909 558 7,467 8.363
Navy 223 3.131 21 3,152 3.375
Air Force 68 2.144 83 2.227 2.295
Intelligence Agencies 1 0 11 1 1
Special Operations Command 15 29 7 35 61
De(onsc Communications Agency 1 1 1
Defense Mapping Agency 8 48 1 49 57
Defense Nuclear Agency 2 0 1/ .2 2
Office of the Secretary of Defense 3 3 3
Total 1.210 12,268 670 12,938 14.148
Nonrecurring costs Included above 922 922 922
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 167 1,631 45 1.676 1,843
Realignmont 2/ 698 69 69 767
1/ Costs are less than $500 thousand.
21 This Includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes equipment support costs, costs associated with increased operational
tempo, spare parts, stock fund purchases, communications, and equipment maintenance.
The previous October-June estimate has been Increased by S143 million. This increase is for higher
in-country operation costs.
Costs reported during this pedod were primarily for in-country operating costs.
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Table 7
INCREMENTAL COSTS A$SOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurreq by the Department of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ In millions)
Preliminary Estimates
EY-1..9qQ 91.. Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Sep Oct - June July through July July 199
Fuel
Army 10 148 16 164 174
Navy 19 1,134 98 1,232 1,251
Air Force 137 2,422 102 2.524 2,661
Special Operations Command 10 1 12 12
Defense Looistics Agency 460 460
Total 626 3,715 217 3,932 4,658
Nonrecurring costs included above
Costs offset by.
In-kind contributions 21 1,176 46 1,222 1,243
oalignment 1/ 60 1 60
11 This Includes the realignment, repfogranipiing, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes tle additional fuel required for higher oporating tempo and for airlift and
sealift tiansportation of personnel and equipment as well as for the higher prices for fuel during the
period.
The previous October-June estimate has been decreased by S212 million to reflect a credit for fuel
which had been charged to Navy but which had in fact been provided as assistance-In-kind.
About 75 percent of the costs reported duing this period were due to higher prices fur fuel with the




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Department of Defense
From August 1, 1990 Through July 31, 1991
($ in millions)
_.-Preliminary Estimates
FY 990 EY19. Partial and
Preliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - Sep Oct - Juno July thlough July July 1991
P er Ctmnj
Army 49 2,351 42 2,393 2.442
Navy 47 2,415 2,415 2,462
Air Force 32 3,372 3,372 3.404
Intelligence Agencies 1 12 1 13 13
Defense Communications Agency 0 1/ 0 0 1/
Special Operations Command 99 99 99
Defense Logistics Agency 4 4 4
Defense Mapping Agency 1 1 1
Defense Nuclear Agency 0 1/ 0 0 1/
Defense Systems Project Office 1 1 1
Office of the Secretary of Defense 21 21 21
Total 129 8,275 43 11 8,318 8,447
Nonrecurring costs Included above 129 8,275 43 11 6,318 8,447
Co s ts oflset by:
in-kind contributions 124 124 124
Realignment 2/ . 119 47 _47 165
11 Costs are loss than $500 thousand.
2/ This Includes the realignment, reprogramming, or transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category Includes ammunition, weapon systems improvements and upgrades, and equipment
purchases.
The previous October - June estimates have bon decreased by S21 million to reflect reestimates of
equipment provided as assistanco-in-kind.
The costs for July rcsult pimatily frorn the loss of Army combat vehicles during a tire at Doha, Kuwait
on July 17th and linalization of Army contracts for purchase of special purpose equipment to facilitate




INCREMENTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATION DESERT STORM
Incurred by the Depaitment of Defense
From August 1. 1990 Through July 31. 1991
($ in millions)
Preliminary Estimates
Ey 1990 FY 1991 Partial andPreliminary
This period Total Aug 1990 -
Aug - S Oct - June July thiough July July 1991
tilitary Construcgion
Army 7 353 353 360
Navy
Alr Force 4 2 2 5
Total 11 355 355 366
Nonrecurring costs Include d above 11 355 355 366
Costs offset by:
In-kind contributions 338 338 338
Realignment 11 11 11
1/ This includes the realignment, reprogramming, of transfer of funds appropriated for activities
unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.
This category includes the cost of constructing temporary billets for troops, and administrative ana
supply and maintenance facilities.
There was a decrease In the previously reported Army October-June costs due to a reestlinato by




FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED IN 1990 TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS 1I
(S in millions)
Receipts in Receipts through
Commitments August September 12, 1991 FUture
Cash In-kind Total Cash In-kind Total Cash In-kind Total Receipts
GCC T TES 5.844 1JQ0 _45 4.256 ,0Qj .5Z 1.588
SALIDI ARABIA 2.474 865 3,339 686 865 1,751 1,588 2/
KUWA!T 2,500 6 2,506 2,500 6 2,506
UAF 870 130 1,000 870 130 1,000
GERMANY 3/ 272 800 1,072 272 782 1,054 18 41
JAPAN 3/ 1,084 656 1,740 39 39 1,084 571 1.655 85 5/
KOREA 50 30 80 50 30 80
BAHRAIN 1 1 1 1
OMAN/QATAR 1 1 1 1
DENMARK 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 7,250 2,490 9,740 39 39 5,662 2,387 8,049 1,691
1 Data was compiled by OMB. Sources of data: commitments -- Defense, State, and Treasury;
cash received -- Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistanco -- Dofonse.
2/ This is reimbursement for enroute transportation thfough December for the second deployment and for
U.S. in-theater expenses for food, building materials, fuel, and support. Bills for reimbursement have
been toiwardod to Saudi Arabia.
31 1990 cash contributions wero for transportation and associated costs.
4/ An accounting of in-kind assistance accepted by U.S. forces Is under way. It Is expected that this
accounting will conclude that the German commitment has bon fully mot.
5/ Resolution of balance is under discussion ond should be resolved shortly.
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Table I I
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED IN 1991 TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS 11
(S in millions)
Receipts in Receipts throuDh
Commitments 2/ Auqust Seplember 12. 1991 Future
__ Cash In-kind Total Cash l-.-10 T2otal Cash In-kind Totl Receipts
.CC STATES 27.C7 U71 20,.08Q 1.215 7 _._72 g285 3.071 .. ,.92Z .1. 1
SAUDI ARA11A 10,546 2,954 13,500 515 55 570 9,166 2,954 12,120 1.380
KUWAIT 13,471 30 13,500 700 2 702 10,690 30 10,720 2,781
UAE 3,000 88 3.088 3,000 88 3,088
GERMANY 5,500 6,500 5,500 6.500
JAPAN 31 8,332 8,332 6,332 8,332
KOREA 100 175 275 3 3 100 41 141 134
DENMARK 11 11 5 5 11 11
LUXEMBOI 'RG 6 6 6 6
OTHER 4 2 6 4 2 6
TOTAL 40,952 3,265 44,218 1,215 65 1,280 36,792 3,132 39,924 4,294
1I Data was compiled by OMB. Sources of data: commitments -- Defense, State, and Treasury;
cash received -- Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistance -- Defense.
2/ 1991 comm~iments In most instances did not distinguish between cash and in-kind. The commitment
shown above reflects actual in-kind assIstance received unless specific Information is available.
3/ 1991 cash contributions aic for logistics and related support.
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Tatble 12
DESCRIPTION OF IN-KIND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED
TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS AS OF AUGUST 31, 1991
(S in millions)
Calendar Year Calendar Year
___ __ ___ __ __ __ _  __ __  __ __ ___ __ __ ___ __ __1990 1991
S A U D I AP A S IA .......................................................................... 865 2,954
Host nation support Including food, fuel, housing, building
materials, transportation and port handling services.
K U W A IT .................................................................................... 6 3 0
Transportation
UNITED ARAB EM IRATES ......................................................... 130 88
Fuel, food and water, security services, Constuction
equipment and civilian labor.
G ER M A N Y ................................................................................ 782
Vehicles including cargo trucks, water trailers, buses
and ambulances, generators; radios; portable showers:
protective masks, and chemical sensing vehicles
JA P A N ...................................................................................... 57 1
Construction and engineering support, vehicles, electronic
data processing, telephone services, medical equipment,
and transportation.
K O R E A ..................................................................................... 30 4 1
Transportation and replenishment stocks
B A H R A IN ...................................................................... .......... ..
Medical supplies, food and water
O M A N /Q A TA R ............................................................... ..........
Oil, telephones, food and water






. TOTAL 2,387 3,132
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Table 13
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGFD IN 1990 AND 1991 TO OFFSET U.S. COSTS
COMMITMENTS AND RECEIPTS THROUGH SEPTEMRER 12, 1991 1/
($ in millions)
Commitments Recoipts 2/ Future
1990 1991 Total Cash In-kind Total Roceipts
GCC STATES L.4§ 30.088 36.93 27.11 4.073 3_1j_.0 5.748
SAUDI ARABIA 3,339 13.500 16,839 10,052 3,819 13,871 2,968
KUWAIT 2,506 13,500 16,006 13,190 36 13,226 2,781
UAE 1,000 3,068 4,088 3,870 218 4,088
GERMANY 1.072 5,500 6,572 5,772 782 6,554 18 3/
JAPAN 1,740 8,332 10,072 9,416 571 9,987 85 4
KOREA 80 275 355 150 71 221 134
OTHER 3 23 26 4 22 26
TOTAL 9,740 44,218 53.958 42,464 5,519 47,973 6,985
1/ Data was compiled by OMB, Sources of data: commitments -- Defense, State. and Tieasury,
cash received -- Treasury; receipts and value of in-kind assistance -- Defense.
2/ Cash receipts are as of September 12,1991. In-kind assistance is as of August 31, 1991.
3/ An accounting of in-kind assistanco accepted by U.S forces Is under way. It Is expected
that this accounting will conclude that the German commitment has been lully met.
4/ Resokirion of balance is under discussion and should be tesolved shortly.
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APPENDIX E: DESCRIPTION OF IN-KIND ASSISTANCE
As of January 31, 1991 over $2.7 billion of in-kind assistance
has been provided by our allies.
By country the total support and examples of the types
provided follows:
($ in millions)
Saudi Arabia ............. 1,556
host nation support including




vehicles including cargo trucks,
water trailers, buses and
ambulances; genera'ors, radios,




support, vehicles, electronic data
processing, telephone services, and
medical equipment.
United Arab Emirates ..... 140












By type of service or product the in-kind assistance received
is as follows:





Equipment, facilities and services 214
Transportation 59
Electronic data processing 23
Warehouse facilities 28
Housing and utilities 59
Telephone and communications services 40
Utilities 13
Other (medical, airport services, security
services; civilian labor, laundry, morale
and welfare, and furniture).
Total $2,728
Under provisions of the 1991 Defense Appropriations Act, the
value of assistance received is determined by the recipients along
the following general guidelines:
Fuel. Price charged by the Defense Fuel Supply Center
(e.g., $1.05 per gallon for JP.4 jet fuel).
Water and food. Local market price.
Other Services.
- Contract cost if known.
- Price previously paid if DoD initially contracted
for the service.
- Best estimate of cost at prevailing rates in Saudi
Arabia.
Equipment.
- Contract cost if known.
- Value set by donating country, subject to Defense
review.
SOURCE: TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM APPENDIX PROVIDED IN THE FIRST FY 1991
DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST OF FEBRUARY 22, 1991.
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